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STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS IN RAILS-TO-TRAILS
ACT COMPENSATION CLAIMS: THE U.S. COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT BENDS
THE RULES OF TAKINGS LAW
Bridget Tomlinson'
In 1983, Congress amended the National Trails System Act (NTSA or
Act),' also known as the Rails-to-Trails Act, to transform the rights-of-
way abandoned by America's railroad companies into a nationwide sys-
tem of recreational trails.2 This innovative program allows railroad com-
panies that are planning to abandon long stretches of land to transfer that
land to organizations or individuals who will convert it into recreational
trails for public use.' The Act has been successful in creating a nation-
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1. The National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-11, 97 Stat
42 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1241-1251 (2000)). The NTSA was amended in
1983 to implement specific processes for transferring railroad rights-of-way to trail use.
See id.; see also Danaya C. Wright & Jeffrey M. Hester, Pipes, Wires, and Bicycles: Rails-to-
Trails, Utility Licenses, and the Shifting Scope of Railroad Easements from the Nineteenth to
the Twenty-First Centuries, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 351, 356-57 (2000) ("The Rails-to-Trails
program was born after . . .Congress, responding to the alarming increase in railroad
abandonments and the growing need for alternative transportation corridors, implemented
what has come to be called its 'railbanking' policy through its amendment of the Trails Act
in 1983.").
2. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1242-1251; see also Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n
(Preseault 1), 494 U.S. 1, 5 (1990); Andrea C. Ferster, Rails-to-Trails Conversions: A Re-
vival of Legal Issues, PLAN. & ENVTL. L., Sept. 2006, at 3, 3. Because travel and shipping
by rail have become virtually obsolete with the advent of faster, more convenient modes of
transportation, thousands of miles of railroad lines have been left unused. See Hash v.
United States, 403 F.3d 1308, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
3. See 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d); see also Preseault I, 494 U.S. at 6-7; Litigation and its
Effect on the Rails-to-Trails Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and
Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 1 (2002) [hereinafter
Hearing 2002] (statement of Rep. Bob Barr, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Commercial and
Administrative Law).
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wide system of trails for the public's benefit, while preserving the gov-
ernment's ability to reactivate the railroads in the event it later deems
4them necessary.
The NTSA "preserve[s] established railroad rights-of-way" by setting
aside (or "railbanking") the land "for future reactivation of rail service."5
Through the NTSA, Congress delegated authority to the Surface Trans-
portation Board (STB) to set up a system in which railroad companies
announce their intent to abandon lines.6 The STB then issues a Notice of
Interim Trail Use or Abandonment (NITU), and potential trail operators
respond to the NITU to negotiate possible take-over of management and
maintenance of the rights-of-way as recreational trails.7 If the trail opera-
4. See 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d); see also Caldwell v. United States, 391 F.3d 1226, 1229
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (explaining that "the STB retains jurisdiction for possible future railroad
use"); Hearing 2002, supra note 3, at 1-2 (statement of Rep. Bob Barr, Chairman, H. Sub-
comm. on Commercial and Administrative Law).
5. See 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d); see also Hash, 403 F.3d at 1311; Wright & Hester, supra
note 1, at 357 ("Under [the Rails-to-Trails Act], the Surface Transportation Board (STB)
oversees the discontinuation of rail services and may preempt the operation of state prop-
erty laws to preserve the railroad easements for possible future reactivation of rail services.
The STB may also permit a recreational trail in the corridor so long as the use is not incon-
sistent with the preservation of the corridor for possible future reactivation for rail ser-
vice." (footnote omitted)).
6. See 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d); 49 U.S.C. § 10,903; 49 C.F.R. § 1152.20 (2006); see also
Caldwell, 391 F.3d at 1228-29. The Surface Transportation Board replaced the Interstate
Commerce Commission in 1995. ICC Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-88, §§ 101,
201, 109 Stat. 803, 804, 932 (1995); Statement on Signing the ICC Termination Act of 1995,
2 PUB. PAPERS 1933 (Dec. 29, 1995) [hereinafter 1995 Signing Statement]. President Clin-
ton promoted the elimination of the ICC in his State of the Union Address in 1995; Con-
gress then created the STB as a subsection of the Department of Transportation and
shifted many ICC functions to the STB. 1995 Signing Statement, supra, at 1933. This
move was an effort to reduce overlap between the ICC and the DOT, and to "produce
moderate budget savings." Id.; see also S. REP. No. 104-176, at 2 (1995) ("Established by
the Act to Regulate Commerce in 1887, the ICC is the oldest independent regulatory
agency. It originally was created to protect shippers from the monopoly power of the
railroad industry. Between 1840 and 1880, the U.S. railroad network grew from 2,800 to
93,000 miles. This boom brought indiscriminate construction, market manipulation, rate
abuses, and discriminatory practices against certain types of freight customers and passen-
gers. In some areas, rail monopolies were able to direct the fate of communities, shippers,
and entire industries.").
7. See 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d); 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29; see also Caldwell, 391 F.3d at 1230.
Not-for-profit groups have been created in order to ensure the transfer of railroad ease-
ments to trails through the NTSA system. See, e.g., Wright & Hester, supra note 1, at 357
& n.19. These groups, such as the National Rails-to-Trails Conservancy, use their re-
sources to assist local trail operators and to watch for STB announcements of railroad
companies seeking to abandon. See id. at 357 ("The National Rails-to-Trails Conservancy
was founded in 1986 to take advantage of these administrative opportunities."); id. at 357
n.19 ("The Rails-to-Trails Conservancy is a non-profit environmental organization that
assists in trail conversion by monitoring abandonments, aiding local trail groups in acquir-
ing the corridor, sometimes funding the land purchase and then reselling it to local manag-
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tor and the railroad company reach an agreement, the NTSA allows for
the transfer of the land from the railroad company to the trail operator.8
Once the transfer is complete, the trail operator assumes financial and
managerial responsibility for the right-of-way on the land, but the STB
retains jurisdiction so that the government will have the option to return
the right-of-way to railroad use in the future. 9
The problem with this system is that in many cases, the railroad does
not own the land it is transferring."' Often, the railroads only own ease-
ments, and not title to the land outright." Therefore, when the railroads
originally acquired the easements to create their rights-of-way, the land-
owners retained fee simple ownership of the land, subject to the railroad
12
companies' easements. The terms of many of these easements required
ers, and then aiding with the construction and operation of the trail at the initial stages."
(citation omitted)).
8. See 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d); see also Caldwell, 391 F.3d at 1229-30.
9. See 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d); see also Caldwell, 391 F.3d at 1229; H.R. REP. No. 98-28,
at 9 (1983), reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 112, 120 ("This provision will protect railroad
interests by providing that the right-of-way can be maintained for future railroad use even
though service is discontinued and tracks removed .... "); Mich. Dep't of Natural Res. v.
Carmody-Lahti Real Estate, Inc., 699 N.W.2d 272, 276 n.3 (Mich. 2005) ("Abandonment is
to be distinguished from mere discontinuance of service. The former involves relinquish-
ing rail lines and underlying property interests. Discontinuance, on the other hand, 'allows
a railroad to cease operating a line for an indefinite period while preserving the rail corri-
dor for possible reactivation of service in the future."' (quoting Preseault v. Interstate
Commerce Comm'n (Preseault I), 494 U.S. 1, 6 n.3 (1990) (citation omitted))).
10. See Hearing 2002, supra note 3, at 13 (statement of Thomas L. Sansonetti, Assis-
tant Att'y Gen., Environment and Natural Resources Division, U.S. Department of Jus-
tice) ("[T]he 1983 law that created the railbanking program has ... had some unforeseen
circumstances. Among those consequences, in particular, it has engendered considerable
litigation against the United States. The litigation arises out of the fact that many iailroads
do not own their rights-of-way outright; but instead, hold them under easements orother
property interests.").
11. Id.; see also Preseault 1, 494 U.S. at 8; Elizabeth F.R. Gingerich, Abandonment of
Railroad Property: A Guide for Attorneys and Landowners, RES GESTAE, Oct. 2003, at 24,
24 ("Railroad companies acquired, and now hold, interests in real property in one of three
designations: fee simple absolute, defeasible fee or by easement.... Unlike an easement, if
the railroad company owns the property in fee simple absolute, the interest will perse-
vere."). An easement is a property interest lesser than full ownership. 28A C.J.S. Ease-
ments § 2 (1996) ("[A]n easement is a right that one has to use another's land for a specific
purpose .. "); id. §5 ("An easement is not the complete ownership of land with the right
to use it for all lawful purposes perpetually and throughout its entire extent, but is a right
only to one or more particular uses.").
12. See Preseault v. United States (Preseault I1), 100 F.3d 1525, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(explaining that, had "the [rJailroad obtained fee simple title to the land over which it was
to operate," the landowners "would have no right or interest in those parcels and could
have no claim related to those parcels for a taking," but if "the [r]ailroad acquired only
easements for use ... and if those easements were limited to uses that did not include
public recreational hiking and biking trails," then the landowners would have a claim
against the government for a taking). Federal and state governments have granted rail-
road companies the ability to exercise eminent domain, recognizing that, "[a]lthough . ..
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that the land immediately "revert"'3 back to the fee simple owners the
'4
moment the railroad stops using the right-of-way for railroad purposes.
In easement cases, therefore, the government's interference with the
abandonment of railroad easements prevents the land from returning to
the underlying landowners, 5 thereby effecting a governmental taking:
railroads are private corporations, they provided great public benefits." Wright & Hester,
supra note 1 at 367-68.
13. More accurately, easements do not "revert" but cease to exist. Once the intended
use for the easement stops, the land stops being burdened by the easement. However, in
rails-to-trails discussions, it is common to use the word "reversion" to describe the underly-
ing fee-simple owner's interest. See ROBERT MELTZ, DWIGHT H. MERRIAM & RICHARD
M. FRANK, THE TAKINGS ISSUE 438 n.8 (1999); see also Preseault II, 100 F.3d at 1533
("Instead of calling the property owner's retained interest a fee simple burdened by the
easement, [the] alternative labels the property owner's retained interest following the
creation of an easement as a 'reversion' in fee .... [I]t is sometimes loosely said that the
estate 'reverts' to the owner."); id. at 1545 ("The usual way in which such an easement
ends is by abandonment, which causes the easement to be extinguished by operation of
law. Upon an act of abandonment, the then owner of the fee estate, the 'burdened' estate,
is relieved of the burden of the easement." (citation omitted)).
14. See, e.g., Preseault 11, 100 F.3d at 1543 ("'[W]hen an easement for railway pur-
poses is found, it is generally considered to end when it is no longer used for the stated
purposes."' (citing JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND
LICENSES IN LAND 1.06[2][d], at 1-48 (rev. ed. 1995))). The Federal Circuit further
explained that "[miost state courts that have been faced with the question of whether
conversion to a nature trail falls within the scope of an original railroad easement have
held that it does not." Id.
15. See, e.g., Toews v. United States, 376 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The transi-
tion from railroad to trail can substantially alter the property owners' land. In Toews v.
United States, for example, the city, which took over the right-of-way as a trail operator,
built a fence on either side of the trail that blocked the landowners' access to the other half
of their property and forced their tenants to terminate their lease. Id. Additionally, in all
rails-to-trails cases, the property owners must share their land with the general public,
rather than exclusively with the railroad company. See, e.g., id. In cases where railroads
have been effectively abandoned for decades, the introduction of the public to these rights-
of-way has had a significant detrimental effect on the owner's beneficial use of his private
property. See, e.g., Preseault 11, 100 F.3d at 1549-50; see also The Easement Owners Fair
Compensation Claims Act: Hearing on H.R. 4581 Before the Subcomm. on National Parks
of the H. Comm. on Resources, 109th Cong. (2006) [hereinafter Hearing 2006] (statement
of Gale Illig) ("While the railroad had a full 100 foot width easement, they only used a
very narrow 12 feet that was occupied by the train tracks and ... that was used infre-
quently. The private trail group transferred this trail easement to the St. Louis County
Park Department and they now claim the right to use the full 100 foot width of the original
railroad easement, including the right to cut and remove all of the foliage [including a
hedge that separated the house from the railroad tracks] on this part of our property.
There are now hundreds of people biking and walking through our property where previ-
ously we enjoyed a quiet and secluded home."). In determining that NTSA transfers effect
takings, the Preseault II court emphasized the vast difference in inconvenience to the land-
owners between railroad use and recreational trail use:
[T]here are differences in the degree and nature of the burden imposed on the servi-
ent estate. It is one thing to have occasional railroad trains crossing one's land. Noisy
though they may be, they are limited in location, in number, and in frequency of oc-
1310 [Vol. 56:1307
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a physical appropriation of the property owner's land by the govern-
ment.
16
The Supreme Court has found the NTSA transfers to be constitutional
takings under the Fifth Amendment.17 Therefore, because these takings
are permissible and landowners cannot prevent the transfer of their land
to trail operators, the landowners' only remedy is the receipt of just com-
pensation from the government." In two recent cases, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit held that the statute of limitations for NTSA
takings claims starts at the very beginning of the transfer process.' 9 But
the NTSA system is uncertain, making it difficult for landowners to de-
termine the statute of limitations period.0 For instance, landowners are
not entitled to individual notice of the potential transfer.21 Most impor-
tantly, negotiations are not certain to end in a transfer to a trail operator:
the limitations period could begin accruing, therefore, before landowners
22
are able to bring a claim for compensation. The decision to interpret
the NTSA system as effecting a taking at the beginning of the negotiation
process is overly burdensome to the property owners, and creates a sys-
tem in which the government can avoid paying compensation rightfully
owed under the Fifth Amendment.
This Comment describes in detail the National Trails System Act, with
particular attention paid to the NTSA's legislative history, the case law
interpreting the NTSA, and the process by which railroad companies
apply for and negotiate interim trail usage. This Comment explains tak-
currence.... When used for public recreational purposes, however, in a region that is
environmentally attractive, the burden imposed by the use of the easement is at the
whim of many individuals, and, as the record attests, has been impossible to contain in
numbers or to keep strictly within the parameters of the easement.
Preseault H, 100 F.3d at 1543.
16. See Preseault I, 100 F.3d at 1551.
17. Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n (Preseault 1), 494 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1990).
The Fifth Amendment states that "private property [shall not] be taken for public use,
without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
18. See, e.g., Preseault 1, 494 U.S. at 4-5; Preseault H, 100 F.3d at 1551-52; Barclay v.
United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1328 (2007);
Caldwell v. United States, 391 F.3d 1226, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Toews, 376 F.3d at 1379.
19. Barclay, 443 F.3d at 1378; Caldwell, 391 F.3d at 1233.
20. See Caldwell, 391 F.3d at 1231 (describing the extension of the NITU deadline on
more than one occasion to accommodate the negotiations between the railroad and the
trail operator, and the ability of the railroad company to "terminate the purchase agree-
ment ... at any time"). Though the Federal Circuit attempted to create a "bright-line rule
for accrual" in Caldwell and Barclay to make the timeline less confusing, the rule does not
eliminate uncertainty for landowners seeking compensation. See Barclay, 443 F.3d at 1378.
21. Nat'l Ass'n of Reversionary Prop. Owners v. Surface Transp. Bd. (NARPO), 158
F.3d 135, 139 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
22. See Caldwell, 391 F.3d at 1236 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("Suit at this stage would
... simply be[] premature; the statute of limitations can not start to accrue before suit
should have been filed.").
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ings generally, and the mechanics behind the judicial decisions regarding
just compensation under the Fifth Amendment. Additionally, this Com-
ment discusses the Tucker Act, which the Supreme Court has determined
provides adequate remedies to landowners affected by the NTSA.23
This Comment then reviews two recent Federal Circuit decisions,
Caldwell v. United States and Barclay v. United States, in which the court
held that takings claims under the NTSA begin to accrue for purposes of
the Tucker Act's six-year statute of limitations at the moment the STB
authorizes a railroad company to negotiate with possible trail operators.4
Because the negotiation process is uncertain, and the railroad is free to
abandon the land at any time before it reaches an agreement with the
potential trail operator,2' the taking should not be effective at the begin-
ning of the NTSA process. 6
This Comment urges reconsideration of the issue and recommends
three solutions. First, the Supreme Court should grant certiorari at the
next opportunity to overturn the Federal Circuit's recent decisions.27 The
Court should find that NTSA takings claims actually begin to accrue at
the time the right-of-way easements are transferred in "ownership" to the
trail operators.
If the Court decides not to grant certiorari, Congress should act to pre-
vent further application of the Barclay and Caldwell decisions. Because
the Federal Circuit is the only court that will hear similar cases, and is
unlikely to overturn its own decisions, the incorrect ruling regarding the
statute of limitations period will remain in place unless Congress adjusts
the NTSA or creates an alternative for compensation outside the Tucker
Act.
The second and third recommendations, therefore, require Congress to
add clarifying language regarding compensation to the NTSA. The sec-
ond recommendation highlights a recent House of Representatives pro-
posal to change the NTSA statute by setting a specific date for the ac-
23. Preseault 1, 494 U.S. at 11-13 ("The Tucker Act provides jurisdiction in the United
States Claims Court for any claim against the Federal Government to recover damages
founded on the Constitution, a statute, a regulation, or an express or implied-in-fact con-
tract." (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1982))).
24. Barclay, 443 F.3d at 1378; Caldwell, 391 F.3d at 1236.
25. See Barclay, 443 F.3d at 1378 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("If [an agreement for
interim trail use] is not reached within 180 days, or an extension thereof, the right-of-way is
deemed abandoned and any easements therefore[e] are extinguished in accordance with
the applicable state law.... Thus, the statute and the NITU do not make trail use manda-
tory, and if trail use is not achieved, the statute effects abandonment of railway use and
reversion of the right-of-way easement." (citations omitted)).
26. See id.; Caldwell, 391 F.3d at 1236-37 (Newman, J., dissenting).
27. The Supreme Court has already denied certiorari in both Barclay and Caldwell.
Barclay v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 1328 (2007); Caldwell v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 366
(2005).
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crual of takings claims. Though the originally proposed bill died in ses-
sion, a similar bill was recently introduced, and this Comment strongly
recommends the adoption of this legislation in the event that the Su-
preme Court decides not to hear an NTSA case.
Third and finally, this Comment recommends that Congress replace the
current NTSA system with a condemnation proceeding similar to those
used for various other physical takings of land. This procedure would
give landowners actual notice of the potential abandonment of the rail-
road easement burdening their land, and an opportunity to petition the
court for updates on the government's search for a suitable trail operator.
The courts would oversee all proceedings, allowing for a clear, fair, and
less burdensome system for receiving just compensation.
I. THE CREATION OF THE RAILS-TO-TRAILS ACT AND THE LEGAL
FRAMEWORK OF TAKINGS COMPENSATION UNDER THE ACT
A. Congress Creates a National Trails System
1. Congress Creates the NTSA in 1968
In 1968, Congress passed the National Trails System Act.28 As set out
in the Statement of Policy, the purpose of the Act was "to provide for the
ever-increasing outdoor recreation needs of an expanding population and
... to promote public access to, travel within, and enjoyment and appre-
ciation of the open-air, outdoor areas of the Nation. 2 9 To do this, the
28. National Trails System Act, Pub. L. No. 90-543, 82 Stat. 919 (1968) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1241-1249 (2000)); see also John S. Davis, The National Trails
System Act and the Use of Protective Federal Zoning, 10 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 189, 189
(1986).
29. National Trails System Act § 2(a); see also H.R. REP. No. 98-28, at 2 (1983), as
reprinted in 1983 U.S.C.C.A.N. 112, 113 (explaining that the NTSA system relies upon
"[v]olunteer efforts by interested trail users themselves, working in concert with various
levels of Government .. .[to] expand[] trail recreation opportunities at low cost"). In
addition to the NTSA, Congress passed the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Re-
form Act (also known as the 4-R Act). Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-210, 90 Stat. 33 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
15, 45, and 49 U.S.C. and former 31 U.S.C.). This Act sought to remedy the shrinking of
the rail system in the United States by attempting to put abandoned rights-of-way to other
"public purposes." Preseault v. United States (Preseault II), 100 F.3d 1525, 1538 (1996)
(citing 49 U.S.C. § 10,906 (1994)); see also Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n
(Preseault 1), 494 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1990). The goal of the 4-R Act was to maintain the railroad
rights-of-way "so that this mode of transportation will remain viable." 45 U.S.C. § 801(a)
(2000). The 4-R Act promoted "conversion of abandoned rights-of-way to recreational
and conservational uses" by offering "assistance to local, state, and federal agencies" to
stop trackage losses. Preseault I, 494 U.S. at 5-6 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 10,906 (1982)). It re-
quired railroad companies to "first offer [a right-of-way] for sale for 'public purposes"'
before they could be allowed to abandon it. Preseault I1, 100 F.3d at 1538 (citing 49 U.S.C.
§ 10,906 (1994)).
2007] 1313
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Act declared that "trails should be established (i) primarily, near the ur-
ban areas of the Nation, and (ii) secondarily, within established scenic
areas more remotely located."3°
The Act set out guidelines for the addition of new trails to the National
Trails System,31 including the "select[ion of] rights-of-way for National
Scenic Trails" and publication in the Federal Register of notice of the in-
tention to include those rights-of-way as part of the system. 2 The Act
also permitted the acquisition of private land if necessary for the trails, as
long as land acquired "without the consent of the owner" constituted
"not more than twenty-five acres in any one mile. ' 3
2. Congress Amends the NTSA in 1983
In 1983, Congress amended the NTSA,34 because the original Act and
the subsequent Railroad Revitalization Act 35 "ha[d] not been successful
in establishing a process through which railroad rights-of-way ... [could]
be utilized for trail purposes., 36 The Amendments included provisions
"authoriz[ing] the [former Interstate Commerce Commission] to preserve
[abandoned railroad rights-of-way] for possible future railroad use" and,
in the interim, to allow for "use of the land as recreational trails., 37 Con-
30. National Trails System Act § 2(a).
31. See id. § 5(a). This system included what the Act called "the initial National Sce-
nic Trails," which included the Appalachian Trail and the Pacific Crest Trail. Id. The Act
also instructed the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of Agriculture to "make
such additional studies ... for the purpose of determining the feasibility and desirability of
designating other trails as national scenic trails." Id. § 5(b). The Act directed that "such
studies shall be the basis of appropriate proposals for additional national scenic trails
which shall be submitted from time to time to the President and to the Congress." Id. The
Act mentioned fourteen trails explicitly as being suitable for study. Id. § 5(c).
32. Id. § 7(a); see also Caldwell v. United States, 391 F.3d 1226, 1230 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
("If the STB approves the request for an exemption, it will publish a notice of exemption
in the Federal Register." (citing 49 C.F.R. § 1121.4(b) (2004))).
33. National Trails System Act § 7(d).
34. See generally National Trails System Act Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-11,
97 Stat. 42. This Comment refers to the entire Act, including the 1983 amendments, as the
NTSA or the Rails-to-Trails Act.
35. See generally Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-210, 90 Stat. 33 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 45, and 49 U.S.C.
and former 31 U.S.C.).
36. H.R. REP. No. 98-28, at 8 (1983); S. REP. No. 98-1, at 9 (1983).
37. Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n (Preseault 1), 494 U.S. 1, 6 (1990); see
also 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (2000). In many cases, railroad companies do not own the rights-
of-way on which their tracks are located. Instead, the companies own easements, and the
original landowners continue to hold fee simple ownership of the land. Preseault 1, 494
U.S. at 8. In addition, many of the easements explicitly state that if the easement ceases to
be used for railroad purposes, the easement expires and no longer burdens the fee simple.
See id. To avoid this, the NTSA describes the transfer of railroad rights-of-way to recrea-
tional trails as temporary, and reserves the right to return them to rights-of-way in the
future. 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d). Therefore the Act calls the use of trails "interim use." Id.
[Vol. 56:13071314
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gress envisioned using these rights-of-way as railroads again in the event
that national security required it,3" and also considered potential use of
these rights-of-way for local transit systems and other types of public
transportation. 9 This process of setting aside rights-of-way for future use
has been called "railbanking" or "banking."4
3. How the NTSA Transfer Process Works
The system Congress created with the NTSA amendments has been
implemented by the STB as follows: First, a railroad company decides to
abandon its right-of-way.4 Because the NTSA restricts railroad compa-
nies from simply dismantling their own rights-of-way, the railroad com-
pany must apply for abandonment with the STB . The STB then issues a
Notice of Interim Trail Use or Abandonment (NITU).43 The NITU gives
the STB jurisdiction over the right-of-way for 180 days, allowing the rail-
road company to negotiate with an individual or organization willing to
convert the land into a trail, and to manage and maintain that
38. See Hearing 2002, supra note 3, at 1 (statement of Rep. Bob Barr, Chairman, H.
Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law) ("While this program has obvious
environmental and recreational benefits, the legislative history of this act indicates another
important consideration by the Congress was... [the] preservation of our rail corridors
which have important implications for our national defense."); id. at 10 (prepared state-
ment of Danaya C. Wright) ("I believe the railbanking program is terribly important, es-
pecially after the devastating September 11 attacks. Protecting railroad corridors and the
possibility of alternative transportation needs is a public priority."); id. at 24 (statement of
Andrea Ferster, General Counsel, Rails-to-Trails Conservancy) ("The curtailment of na-
tional air travel following September 11th tragically demonstrated the importance of rail
corridor preservation efforts as a way to achieve needed redundancy in our national trans-
portation network.").
39. See id. at 15 (prepared statement of Thomas L. Sansonetti, Assistant Att'y Gen.,
Environment and Natural Resources Division, U.S. Department of Justice) ("The
amendments allow... land ... [to] be transferred to the trail operator for interim trail use,
subject to the right to restore or reactivate rail use, including use as light rail for commut-
ers.").
40. See, e.g., Hash v. United States, 403 F.3d 1308, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also
Hearing 2002, supra note 3, at 2 (statement of Rep. Bob Barr, Chairman, H. Subcomm. on
Commercial and Administrative Law) ("Through the statutory process referred to as 'rail
banking,' a railroad wishing to cease operating along a particular route can negotiate with
a State, municipality, or private group that is prepared to assume financial and managerial
responsibility... [and] agrees to transfer ownership of the corridor back to the railroad.").
41. See 49 U.S.C. § 10,903(a) (2000).
42. See id. § 10,903(a)(2); see also Caldwell v. United States, 391 F.3d 1226, 1229-30
(Fed. Cir. 2004) ("[T]he typical railbanking process begins when a rail carrier files an
abandonment application or ... a request for an exemption." (citations omitted)).
43. 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29 (2006); see also Caldwell, 391 F.3d at 1230 ("If the STB ap-
proves the request for an exemption, it will publish a notice of exemption in the Federal
Register." (citing 49 C.F.R. § 1121.4(b) (2004))).
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trail.44 Once the two parties reach an agreement, the trail operator effec-
tively holds the right-of-way easement for the possibility that the. gov-
ernment will want to return the trail to railroad use at some point in the
future.45 The STB's jurisdiction over the right-of-way therefore extends
indefinitely 6 However, if no agreement is reached within the 180-day
deadline, the NITU allows the railroad company to abandon the right-of-
way, ending the STB's jurisdiction and relieving the underlying fee simple
estate of the burden of the easement. 7
4. How the NTSA System Differs from Typical Takings
Unlike the NTSA system, many physical takings occur through formal
condemnation proceedings." Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 71A gov-
44. See 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(d)(1); see also Caldwell, 391 F.3d at 1230 (stating that the
"potential trail operator ... file[s] a railbanking petition" and, if the railroad agrees to
negotiate with the potential trail operator, the STB then "issue[s] a Notice of Interim Trail
Use or Abandonment."). It is common for the negotiations between the railroad and the
trail operator to start before the actual issuance of the NITU: "In some cases... an interim
trail use agreement may in fact be reached prior to the issuance of the NITU. In other
cases,.., the NITU is issued ... prior to the finalization of an agreement." Caldwell, 391
F.3d at 1230.
45. See 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(a)(3); see also Caldwell, 391 F.3d at 1229 (explaining that
"the STB retains jurisdiction for possible future railroad use," thereby blocking abandon-
ment of the easement); Hearing 2002, supra note 3, at 2 (statement of Rep. Bob Barr,
Chairman, H. Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law) ("[T]he conversion to a
trail is completed on a temporary or interim basis, because the law potentially provides for
two-way conversions: first, conversion to a trail; and second, the possible reactivation of
rail service .... ).
46. Caldwell, 391 F.3d at 1230 ("If negotiations go as planned and an agreement is
reached, the NITU extends indefinitely for the duration of recreational trail use subject to
the trail operator's fulfillment of its agreed-upon obligations.").
47. See 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(d)(1); see also Caldwell, 391 F.3d at 1230 ("[I]f no agree-
ment is reached within 180 days, the NITU 'automatically converts into an effective...
notice of abandonment' which permits the rail carrier to 'abandon the line entirely and
liquidate its interest."' (quoting Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n (Preseault 1),
494 U.S. 1, 7 & n.5 (1990) (citations omitted))).
48. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 71A (proscribing procedures for actions in federal
district courts to condemn private property). While a condemnation proceeding is the
formal way for the government to effect a physical taking, the government performs physi-
cal takings through inverse condemnation as well:
Broadly speaking, the United States may take property pursuant to its power of
eminent domain in one of two ways: it can enter into physical possession of the prop-
erty without authority of a court order; or it can institute condemnation proceedings
under various Acts of Congress providing authority for such takings. Under the first
method-physical seizure-no condemnation proceedings are instituted, and the
property owner is provided a remedy under the Tucker Act to recover just compensa-
tion. Under the second procedure the Government may either employ statues which
require it to pay over the judicially determined compensation before it can enter upon
the land or proceed under other statutes which enable it to take immediate possession
upon order of court before the amount of just compensation has been ascertained.
United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 21 (1958) (citations omitted).
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erns these proceedings.49 This rule requires that the government file a
complaint in district court if it plans to take land using its power of emi-
nent domain.0 The complaint must describe the land, the reason for the
taking, and the government's "authority for the taking."'" The govern-
ment becomes the plaintiff in a civil action, and all persons with an inter-
est in the property, whether known or unknown, become defendants.
Under Rule 71A, all defendants are served with process52 and may submit
an answer to the complaint stating their objections to the taking.53 The
court then determines an amount for compensation, and gives the gov-
ernment a court order to pay the landowner prior to its occupation of the
land.54
B. The Supreme Court Finds the NTSA Constitutional
The Supreme Court issued its only decision regarding the Rails-to-
Trails Act with Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Commission (Preseault
I) in 1990."s In that case, the plaintiffs challenged the taking of a railroad
right-of-way on their land for use as a public trail.56 The plaintiffs owned
the land in fee simple57 and argued that the land should have reverted to
49. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 71A; see also E. Tenn. Natural Gas Co. v. Sage, 361
F.3d 808, 821 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1,
3-4 (1984)).
50. FED. R. Civ. P. 71A(a),(c); see also E. Tenn. Natural Gas Co., 361 F.3d at 821.
51. FED. R. Civ. P. 71A(c)(2).
52. Id.
53. Id.; FED. R. CIv. P. 71A(e). If a property owner has no objections to the taking,
he can "serve a notice of appearance"; if he does so within the designated time, he will be
entitled to "receive notice of all proceedings affecting" the land. FED. R. Civ. P. 71A(e).
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 71A(j) ("The plaintiff shall deposit with the court any money
required by law as a condition to the exercise of the power of eminent domain .... If the
compensation finally awarded to any defendant exceeds the amount which has been paid
to that defendant on distribution of the deposit, the court shall enter judgment against the
plaintiff and in favor of that defendant for the deficiency. If the compensation finally
awarded to any defendant is less than the amount which has been paid to that defendant,
the court shall enter judgment against that defendant and in favor of the plaintiff for the
overpayment.").
55. 494 U.S. 1 (1990).
56. Id. at 9-10. The land was originally taken as an easement, whereby the land would
"cease to be a burden on the underlying fee if railroad use were abandoned." Brief for
Petitioners at 4 n.3, Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n (Preseault 1), 494 U.S. 1
(1990) (No. 88-1076) (citing Tr. of the Diocese of Vt. v. State, 496 A.2d 151, 152 (Vt.
1985)). The railroad company stopped using the right-of-way in the late 1960s or early
1970s, and had removed all tracks by 1975. Preseault 1, 494 U.S. at 9; Brief for Petitioners,
supra at 5. The plaintiffs sought to quiet their title in the land in 1981, based on the rail-
road company's abandonment of the right-of-way. Preseault I, 494 U.S. at 9.
57. Preseault v. United States (Preseault II), 100 F.3d 1525, 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1996). The
Federal Circuit described the burden on the Preseaults' land of the transfer from railroad
to trail:
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them once it stopped being used as a railroad.58 They argued that the
government's interference with the reversion was an unconstitutional
taking of their land for two reasons. First, it was beyond Congress's
commerce power to enact the legislation; 9 and second, the Act did not
provide just compensation, which rendered it unconstitutional.6
The Court did not find it necessary to reach the issue of whether trans-
fers to trail operators under the NTSA constituted takings.6' Instead, the
Court ruled that the Act was a legitimate use of Congress's commerce
[A]n eight foot wide paved strip was established on the former right-of-way .... The
path is some 60 feet from the Preseaults' front door. On each side of the Preseaults'
driveway, where it crosses the easement, two concrete posts and one metal post were
installed to block automobile traffic. The city also erected two stop signs on the path
and built a water main under and along the path....
The path is used regularly by members of the public for walking, skating, and bicy-
cle riding. On warm weekends up to two hundred people an hour go through the Pre-
seaults' property. People using the path often trespass on the Preseaults' front yard.
Id. at 1550.
58. Preseault I, 494 U.S. at 9. When property owners retain a fee simple interest in
the land, and the railroad owns only an easement to use the land for railroad purposes,
there is actually no "reversion" that should occur because the railroad does not own a
defeasible fee. See Preseault II, 100 F.3d at 1533-34. In fact, once the easement ends, the
property owners' underlying fee simple owned by the property owners simply stops being
burdened by the easement. See id. However, it is common to use the term "reversion"
when discussing the issue of railroad right-of-way conversion. Id. at 1533; see also supra
note 13.
59. Preseault I, 494 U.S. at 4; see also Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 853
F.2d 145, 147 (2d Cir. 1988), affd, 494 U.S. 1 (1990). Because the rights-of-ways had been
abandoned without the approval of the ICC, the Superior Court of Chittenden County,
Vermont determined that it did not have jurisdiction to quiet title "because the ICC had
not authorized abandonment ... and therefore still exercised exclusive jurisdiction," and
the state supreme court affirmed. Preseault 1, 494 U.S. at 9 (citing Tr. of the Diocese of Vt.,
496 A.2d 151). The state and the railroad subsequently applied for permission to abandon
with the ICC, and the ICC dismissed the property owners' claims. Id. at 9-10; see also
Preseault, 853 F.2d at 147-48. The Preseaults then brought a claim against the ICC in fed-
eral court on the grounds that the NTSA effected an unconstitutional taking against them.
Preseault 1, 494 U.S. at 4. The Second Circuit determined that the Rails-to-Trails Act
could not effect a taking in any circumstance. Preseault, 853 F.2d at 151. The Supreme
Court subsequently granted certiorari to determine whether the Rails-to-Trails Act was
constitutional. Preseault 1, 494 U.S. at 10.
60. Preseault 1, 494 U.S. at 10.
61. Id. at 4 ("We find it unnecessary to evaluate the merits of the takings claim be-
cause we hold that even if the Rails-to-Trails statute gives rise to a taking, compensation is
available to petitioners under the Tucker Act and the requirements of the Fifth Amend-
ment are satisfied." (citation omitted)). But see id. at 22 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (im-
plying that the Court would, in fact, have found NTSA transfers to be takings if it were
necessary for the Court to decide the issue because "[t]he [ICC's] actions may delay prop-
erty owners' enjoyment of their reversionary interests, but that delay burdens and defeats
the property interest rather than suspends or defers the vesting of those property rights.
Any other conclusion would [be] ... incompatible with the Fifth Amendment." (citations
omitted)).
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power,62 and that, if the Act effected a taking, the taking was constitu-
tional because the Tucker Act provided a remedy for just compensation.63
As the Court explained, "[aIll that is required by the Fifth Amendment is
the existence of a 'reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtain-
ing compensation." '64 The NTSA met the constitutional requirement of
just compensation, and the Court found it unnecessary to decide the tak-
ings issue since the plaintiffs had failed to seek compensation via the
available remedy. 65
C. The Federal Circuit Finds that the NTSA Effects Takings
The issue of whether an NTSA conversion caused a taking remained
undecided after Presault L But in 1996, the Preseaults' Tucker Act claim
reached the Federal Circuit.66 In that case, commonly known as Preseault
II, the court determined that the Rails-to-Trails Act did effect a taking
against the property owners. 67 The court reiterated the Supreme Court's
62. Id. at 18-19 (majority opinion); see also Jeff Sharp, Rails-to-Trails, Rational Gov-
ernments, and a Constitutional Shortcut: The Perils of Preseault, 29 REAL EST. L.J. 299,
306-07 (2001) ("Upon Supreme Court review, the Commerce Clause issue was resolved
with relatively little discussion .... The Court applied the traditional rule of deference,
finding a rational basis for the legislation and that the means.., were 'reasonably adapted
to the end permitted by the Constitution."' (footnotes omitted)).
63. Preseault 1, 494 U.S. at 11-13, 17. Because "'taking claims.., are premature until
the property owner has availed itself of the process provided by the Tucker Act,"' the
plaintiffs could not bring a claim against the federal government until they had exhausted
the available Tucker Act remedy. Id. at 11 (quoting Williamson County Reg'l Planning
Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985)). The Tucker Act
requires that all constitutionally-based claims against the U.S. government be brought in
the Court of Federal Claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2000). But "[t]he Tucker Act...
,merely confers jurisdiction"' on the Court of Federal Claims for claims that already exist;
it does not itself "'create any substantive right"' or new cause of action against the gov-
ernment. Allen v. United States, 46 Fed. C1. 677, 680 (2000) (quoting Berry v. United
States, 27 Fed. Cl. 96, 100 (1992)). In addition, only takings that have been "authorized by
Congress, expressly or by implication," are subject to Tucker Act jurisdiction. NBH Land
Co. v. United States, 576 F.2d 317, 319 (Ct. C1. 1978) (citing Hooe v. United States, 218
U.S. 322, 3335 (1910)); see also Sharp, supra note 62, at 308-09 ("Claims against the federal
government for damages founded on the Constitution, a statute, a regulation, or an express
or implied-in-fact contract are placed under the jurisdiction of the United States Court of
Federal Claims by virtue of the Tucker Act. Takings claims fall within this description."
(footnotes omitted)).
64. Preseault I, 494 U.S. at 11 (quoting Reg'l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S.
102, 124-25 (1974)); see also Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n, 473 U.S. at 194
("If the government has provided an adequate process for obtaining compensation, and if
resort to that process 'yield[s] just compensation,' then the property owner 'has no claim
against the Government' for a taking." (alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
65. Preseault I, 494 U.S. at 4, 17.
66. Preseault v. United States (Preseault II), 100 F.3d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
67. Id. at 1530-31, 1551 ("We have here a straightforward taking of private property
for a public use for which just compensation must be paid."). The court determined that
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determination, however, that the government's constitutional right to
exercise eminent domain to convert railroads into trails did not exempt it
from paying "just compensation for the state-created rights thus de-
stroyed." 68 The court determined that the Preseaults had suffered a tak-
ing,69 and that they therefore deserved just compensation from the
the original easement to the railroad company was not sufficiently broad to include recrea-
tional trails:
When the easements here were granted to the Preseaults' predecessors in title at
the turn of the century, . . . could it be said that the parties contemplated that a cen-
tury later the easements would be used for recreational hiking and biking trails ... ?
We think not .... In the one case, the grantee is a commercial enterprise using the
easement in its business .... In the other, the easement belongs to the public, and is
open for use for recreational purposes, which happens to involve people engaged in
exercise or recreation on foot or on bicycles. It is difficult to imagine that either party
to the original transfers had anything remotely in mind that would resemble a public
recreational trail.
Id. at 154243. This decision was an en banc rehearing of the case, overruling a decision by
a three-judge panel. Id. at 1529; see also Hearing 2002, supra note 3, at 28 (prepared
statement of Andrea Ferster, General Counsel, Rails-to-Trails Conservancy) (emphasizing
that the en banc decision in Preseault IH was a plurality, rather than a majority, opinion).
Though the Preseault H decision was a plurality, it has been upheld in later Rails-to-Trails
cases. See, e.g., Caldwell v. United States, 391 F.3d 1226, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
68. Preseault H, 100 F.3d at 1537 (citing Preseault I, 494 U.S. at 22 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)). The government argued unsuccessfully that a long line of federal railroad
laws enacted after the creation of the easements effectively trumped the state easement
law in place at the time of the conveyance. See id.
69. Preseault 11, 100 F.3d at 1551. The court explained that its holding was limited: for
example, "if the railroad owns the right-of-wa; :.i fee simple," then the landowner does not
own an underlying property right and no taking occurs when the railroad converts to a
trail. Id. at 1551; see also Hearing 2002, supra note 3, at 7 (prepared statement of Danaya
C. Wright) (explaining that "[t]here are only two situations in which the railbanking stat-
ute" effects a taking: first, "where the landowner conveyed a defeasible fee simple interest
to the railroad and retained a reverter interest," and second, "where the landowner con-
veyed only an easement to the railroad for purposes of running trains.").
In a subsequent unpublished decision, the court further determined that the language of
each specific easement can restrict a landowner's ability to seek compensation. See Chevy
Chase Land Co. of Montgomery County, Md. v. United States, No. 97-5079, 1999 WL
1289099, at *2-3 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 17, 1999) (citing Preseault II, 100 F.3d at 1552). Specifi-
cally, based on questions certified to the Court of Appeals of Maryland, the Federal Cir-
cuit held that an easement written in broad language that can be construed to include trail
use will not effect a taking if transferred to a trail operator. Id. As long as trail use is
within the parameters of the original easement, the transfer to a trail is a legitimate use of
the land and does not effect a taking. Id. ("'[I]f the terms of the easement when first
granted are broad enough ... to encompass trail use, the servient estate holder would not
be in a position to complain about the use of the easement for a permitted purpose."'
(quoting Preseault 11, 100 F.3d at 1552)). Therefore, the court determined that compensa-
tion was unnecessary because the landowners had not suffered an additional taking. Id. at
*3.
In 2004, the Federal Circuit decided Toews v. United States, which it distinguished from
Chevy Chase Land Co. because the "terms of the deed of grant [of the easement a]re ex-
Bending the Rules of Takings Law
government.7 °
1. Takings Generally
Takings by the government are not prohibited." In fact, the Fifth
Amendment allows for the taking of private property upon payment of
"just compensation. 7 1 In addition to the requirement that the property
owner receive just compensation, the Supreme Court has also deter-
mined that the government may only take property for public use.73 Fur-
plicit." Toews v. United States, 376 F.3d 1371, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The easement in
Toews clearly did not include trail use, and the transfer to trail use was therefore a taking.
Id. at 1381. In addition, the court reaffirmed its holding in Preseault II, that the federal
government remains liable for the taking even if "the Government acts through a state
agent." Id. at 1381-82 (citing Preseault II, 100 F.3d at 1551). The court rejected the gov-
ernment's argument that the taking was "a consequence of what the [City] did, . . .and
thus it was not the responsibility of the United States." Id. at 1381. Cf Preseault I1, 100
F.3d at 1551 (discussing and rejecting a similar argument).
70. Preseault 1I, 100 F.3d at 1551. The court concluded that "if the Preseaults have
interests under state property law that have traditionally been recognized and protected
from governmental expropriation, and if, over their objection, the Government chooses to
occupy or otherwise acquire those interests, the Fifth Amendment compels compensa-
tion." Id. at 1550. Many Rails-to-Trails Act proponents have argued that the transfer of
railroad easements to trail operators only slightly inconveniences landowners, and that the
minimal change in the landowners' situations should not warrant government compensa-
tion. See Hearing 2002, supra note 3, at 10 (prepared statement of Danaya C. Wright)
("The economic impact of not being able to incorporate rail corridor land into their back-
yards most likely does not lower their property values ...."). However, the Supreme
Court has held that "permanent occupations of land ... are takings even if they occupy
only relatively insubstantial amounts of space and do not seriously interfere with the land-
owner's use of the rest of his land." Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419,430 (1982).
71. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment restrictions on eminent do-
main do not apply only to the federal government; under the Fourteenth Amendment,
state and local governments that take private property for public use must also provide
compensation. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 119, 122
(1978).
72. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also United States v. Carmack, 329 U.S. 230, 241-42
(1946) (noting that the Fifth Amendment obligates the government to pay for takings,
rather than granting explicitly the power to exercise eminent domain); JOHN E. NOWAK &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 505, 507 (7th ed. 2004). The Supreme
Court has explained that the Fifth Amendment takings clause "[is] designed to bar Gov-
ernment from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." Armstrong v. United States, 369 U.S.
40, 49 (1960); see also Boling v. United States, 220 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("The
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution ensures that the federal government
does not appropriate private property for public use without just compensation.");
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra, at 507 (discussing the origins of the compensation require-
ment as a moral obligation of the government).
73. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 72, at 507; see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Coun-
cil, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) ("[W]hen the owner of real property has been called to
sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, . . . he has suf-
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thermore, takings can occur without any direct government action at all:
if the government "puts into play a series of events which result in a tak-
ing of private property," it is enough to constitute government action for
the purposes of takings. In other words, it is immaterial that the gov-
ernment effects the taking indirectly through a third party.
2. Physical Versus Regulatory Takings
The government can effect two kinds of takings on a person's property:
76physical takings and regulatory takings. Physical takings involve an ac-
tual physical appropriation of the property owner's land,77 whereas regu-
latory takings occur when the government implements legislation that
effectively bars the land owner from using the land as he would otherwise
prefer.8
fered a taking."). But see Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 488-90 (2005) (allow-
ing the taking of private property for an arguably private-rather than public-use).
74. Preseault H, 100 F.3d at 1551. The court rejected the government's argument that
"since it was the City that actually established the trail, the United States should not be
considered the responsible actor." Id. at 1551; see also discussion of Toews v. United States,
supra note 69. The court cited Hendler v. United States, in which the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency "issued an Order which ... authorized and directed the State of California
to enter upon the land of the Hendlers ... [to] establish monitoring wells." Preseault II,
100 F.3d at 1551 (citing Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). The
court had found in Hendler that "[w]hen California acted pursuant to the Order, it acted
under the aegis of the United States, and its actions were, for purposes of takings liability,
the actions of the United States." Id.
75. See Preseault II, 100 F.3d at 1551.
76. Boling, 220 F.3d at 1370 ("A wide spectrum of governmental action has been
found to constitute a taking of property within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, rang-
ing from the actual physical occupation of land to ... the enactment of a regulation or
statute.").
77. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 441
(1982) (affirming "the traditional rule that a permanent physical occupation of property is
a taking"). In Loretto, the State of New York enacted a regulation that prevented land-
lords from limiting cable companies' access to their property and preventing the collection
of fees by landlords from tenants or cable companies over a certain amount. Id. at 423.
The Court found that the presence of cables on the plaintiff's amounted to "a permanent
physical occupation authorized by government [which] is a taking without regard to the
public interests that it may serve." Id. at 426.
78. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 72, at 509 ("Although the concept of a
taking may originally have contemplated only physical appropriation, it is plain today that
non-acquisitive governmental action may amount to a taking in the constitutional sense.");
see also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,
322 n.17 (2002). For example, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, the Court determined
that legislation restricting coal mining under residential houses was a taking, though the
land was not physically occupied by the government. 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922). The regu-
lation restricted the coal companies' use of land they rightfully owned beneath the surface
by preventing them from mining it. Id. at 412-13.
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The Federal Circuit explained in Preseault H that NTSA takings cannot
be categorized as regulatory.79 Instead, because the NTSA authorizes
"physical entry upon ... private lands . . .under the federal govern-
ment's authority pursuant to the ICC's Order," these takings are physi-
cal.80 The seizure of the Preseaults' land in order to create "a public trail
was in effect a taking of a new easement for that new use."'" Further, the
court explained that the "new easement for the new use" necessarily
"constitut[ed] a physical taking of the right of exclusive possession that
belonged to the Preseaults.
8 2
3. Timing: When a Taking Occurs
For NTSA takings in particular, it has become important to determine
when the actual taking occurs. The Supreme Court has explained that in
cases where a taking occurs through a "physical invasion ... the usual
rule is that the time of the invasion constitutes the act of taking." 83 All
takings, whether physical or regulatory, occur when "'all events which fix
the government's . .. liability have occurred." '84 Therefore, a takings
79. See Preseault H, 100 F.3d at 1538-40. The government attempted to argue that the
1920 Transportation Act, the 4-R Act of 1976, and the 1983 NTSA Amendments effected
regulatory takings through the possibility of transfers of rights-of-way to trail use. Id. at
1537-38. The court rejected this argument, concluding that "enactment of broad general
legislation authorizing a federal agency to engage in future regulatory activity is not the
type of government action that alone supports a taking claim." Id. at 1538 (citing Hodel v.
Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981)).
80. Id. at 1551; see also Appellants' Reply Brief at 4-5, Caldwell v. United States, 391
F.3d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (No. 03-5152) (arguing that the analysis for regulatory takings is
inappropriate for physical takings: "The government's reliance on regulatory takings
precedents in a physical takings case violates the Supreme Court's recent admonition that
the 'longstanding distinction between acquisitions of property for public use, on the one
hand, and regulations prohibiting private uses, on the other, makes it inappropriate to treat
cases involving physical takings as controlling precedents for... [regulatory takings], and
vice versa."' (citing Tahoe, 535 U.S. at 323)).
81. Preseault II, 100 F.3d at 1550.
82. Id.
83. United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 258 (1980) (citing United States v. Dow, 357
U.S. 17, 22 (1958)). In Caldwell, the plaintiffs argued that because takings under the
NTSA are physical, and not regulatory, the specific facts of each case are not important to
the determination of the time when the taking occurs:
[T]his is a permanent physical taking claim, and straightforward property rules, not
complex factual assessments, govern. The question is simply when, as a matter of law,
the Appellants' property interest was converted to interim trail use pursuant to 16
U.S.C. § 1247(d) .... This could not have occurred before [the trail operator] had the
right to enter upon the land to manage the trail and was actually responsible for taxes
and legal liability, as required by the statute and supporting regulations.
Appellants' Reply Brief, supra note 80, at 5.
84. Boling v. United States, 220 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting Hopland
Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, 855 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). In Boling,
the court further recognized that "the key date for accrual purposes is the date on which
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claim logically must begin to accrue at the point of the physical invasion
or take-over, and the value of the property should be assessed as of that
date."
In Preseault II, the Federal Circuit described the "Government's use of
the property for a public trail" as a "new, unauthorized, use," firmly stat-
ing that whether or not the land had been previously abandoned, the
government's use was a taking. 6 Though this language suggests that the
taking occurs at the point when the new use begins-when the trail op-
erator enters the land-the Federal Circuit determined in 2004, in Cald-
well v. United States, that the statute of limitations began, instead, at the
moment the STB issued the NITU announcing the railroad company's
intent to abandon its right-of-way. 87
D. Statute of Limitations and NTSA Takings Claims
Even if the Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction over. a claim, "pro-
cedural limitations still exist," including a statute of limitations.8 The
Tucker Act states that "[e]very claim ... shall be barred unless the peti-
tion thereon is filed within six years after such claim first accrues.""
the plaintiffs land has been clearly and permanently taken." Id. (citing Seldovia Native
Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 144 F.3d 769, 774 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
85. See Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 39, Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (No. 05-1255) ("If a physical intrusion is the hallmark of a per se physical
takings claim, it is self-evident that the claim for a per se physical taking can accrue no
earlier than the time when the physical intrusion occurs .... The Supreme Court's discus-
sions concerning physical takings cases support no other conclusion .....
86. Preseault 11, 100 F.3d at 1549.
87. Caldwell v. United States, 391 F.3d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
88. Allen v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 677, 680 (2000). The statute of limitations
imposed on Tucker Act claims is an "express limitation upon the waiver of sovereign im-
munity contained in the Tucker Act." Id. Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the
government is presumptively exempt from liability unless it explicitly consents to it.
MICHAEL L. WELLS & THOMAS A. EATON, CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES 1 (2002)
("From the beginning of our history as a nation, the central obstacle to an effective system
of constitutional remedies has been the doctrine of 'sovereign immunity': that is, the prin-
ciple that the government may not be sued without its consent."). The tradition of sover-
eign immunity in the United States originated in the thirteenth century with the immunity
of the English monarchy. See id. at 2. When the American colonies won independence,
they chose not to abolish the doctrine of sovereign immunity, but instead adopted it as
applicable to both the federal government and the governments of each individual state.
Id. at 3. Even given the historical assumption that the government is immune from suits
against it, the U.S. Congress has gradually given its consent to suits through actions such as
the creation of the Court of Claims in 1855, and through legislation such as the Tucker Act
in 1887 and the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946. Id. at 11.
89. 28 U.S.C. § 2501 (2000); see also Allen, 46 Fed. Cl. at 680. In addition to the statute
of limitations, Congress placed other conditions on the Tucker Act exemption from sover-
eign immunity. Specifically, Congress can exempt certain legislation from the Tucker Act:
where Congress has explicitly "withdrawn the Tucker Act grant of jurisdiction," the Court
of Federal Claims may not hear claims involving that statute even if such claims are
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The issue, then, becomes determining when the claim begins to
90
accrue..
1. Caldwell v. United States Sets Date of Accrual
In 2004, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit de-
cided Caldwell v. United States.9t In that case, the railroad announced its
intent to abandon its right-of-way, and the STB issued a notice in order to
promote a railbanking agreement. The city successfully petitioned for a
NITU in August 1994, and before the 180-day time limit had expired, it
moved for an extension. 93 The STB extended the negotiation period for
an additional 180 days to August 1995.94 The city arranged for a trail
group to purchase the right-of-way, but no closing date was set.95 The city
and the group finally signed a railbanking agreement in July 1996, but
requested that the NITU "be further extended 'through the time of the
actual transfer of the corridor to the interim trail manager.' ' 96 The rail-
road company finally transferred the land to the city in October 1996,
more than two years after the STB issued the original NITU.97
The plaintiffs brought suit for compensation under the Tucker Act, but
the government argued that the statute of limitations had run.98 The
"'founded ... upon the Constitution."' Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n (Pre-
seault 1), 494 U.S. 1, 12 (1990) (quoting Reg'I Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102,
126 (1974)) (alteration in original). Where Congress exempts a statute from the Tucker
Act, it exercises the government's sovereign immunity. See WELLS & EATON, supra note
88, at 10-11. In Preseault I, for example, the Court explained that the plaintiffs had a rem-
edy through the Tucker Act because the NTSA did not explicitly exempt the Act from
Tucker Act jurisdiction. Preseault 1, 494 U.S. at 12. Additionally, in order to bring a
Tucker Act claim, the plaintiffs must be willing to concede that the government's actions
were legal; they must be seeking only compensation. Alameda Gateway, Ltd. v. United
States, 45 Fed. C1. 757, 762 (1999).
90. See Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127
S. Ct. 1328 (2007). The majority opinion in Barclay determined that the "[a]ppellants'
arguments [would] lead potentially to multiple takings of a single reversionary interest and
endless litigation concerning the appropriate date for accrual." Barclay, 443 F.3d at 1378.
But in her dissenting opinion, Judge Newman explained that "[w]hen the government
issued the NITU herein, it was not known whether the right-of-way would be converted to
a recreational trail. If the ensuing negotiations had failed ... there could be no taking."
Barclay, 443 F.3d at 1380 (Newman, J., dissenting).
91. Caldwell, 391 F.3d 1226.
92. Id. at 1230-31.
93. Id. at 1231.
94. Id.
95. Id. The purchase agreement stated that closing "would 'occur ... within three
hundred sixty five (365) days,"' but also allowed for the trail group to terminate the
agreement at any time prior to closing without incurring liability. Id.
96. Id.
97. See id. at 1231-32.
98. Id. at 1228.
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Caldwells brought their claim on October 7, 2002, just four days shy of six
years from the date the transfer from the railroad company to the trail
operator was recorded. 99 But the court determined that the Caldwells
were barred from receiving compensation because a taking pursuant to
the Rails-to-Trails Act actually begins accruing for purposes of the
Tucker Act's statute of limitations when the railroad and trail operator
announce their "intention to negotiate a trail use agreement" and the
STB issues a NITU.'0° In other words, the court determined that the tak-
ing in an NTSA transfer occurs when the railroad announces its intent to
abandon, and not when the railroad right-of-way is actually transferred
for trail use.1 °1
2. Barclay v. United States Upholds Caldwell
Similarly, in 2006, the Federal Circuit decided in Barclay v. United
States that the plaintiffs' claims for compensation under the Tucker Act
were barred because the statute of limitations had run.'0 The reasoning
in Barclay was essentially the same as that in Caldwell: the NITU effected
the taking, and any claims for compensation should have been brought
within six years of the STB's issuance of the NITU.a°3 The court further
99. Id. at 1232.
100. Id. at 1228, 1235. Though the lower court had held in favor of the government, it
determined that the start-date for the statute of limitations was the transfer of the right-of-
way from the railroad upon the signing of an agreement. Caldwell v. United States, 57
Fed. Cl. 193, 203 (2003), affd, 391 F.3d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2004) ("[T]he court holds that the
Government taking is fixed upon the signing of the Trail Use Agreement. At that time the
provisions of the NITU become permanent, depriving the plaintiffs of their rights in the
land in question."). The Federal Circuit affirmed the decision in favor of the government,
but determined that the statute of limitations begins instead at the issuance of the NITU.
Caldwell, 391 F.3d at 1236.
101. See Caldwell, 391 F.3d at 1233. The court determined that the taking begins at
that moment because the NITU acts to prevent abandonment according to section 8(d) of
the NTSA. Id.; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (2000). The Caldwell plaintiffs had contended
that the government's arguments for setting the taking at the time of the NITU were
flawed for three reasons:
First, the Government implies that Trails Act takings are regulatory takings, which
are subject to an ad hoc factual analysis, when binding law holds that a taking under
the Trails Act is a physical taking, and subject to straightforward property law rules.
Second, the Government seeks to blur the lines between the issuance of the NITU
and the ultimate authorization of conversion to trail use under the NITU; it can only
be the conversion that effects a taking. Finally, the Government contends that an act
by the United States is necessary to implicate the United States in a taking, even
though cases from the Supreme Court and this Court show that is not so.
Appellants' Reply Brief, supra note 80, at 1.
102. Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S.
Ct. 1328 (2007).
103. Id. at 1378. The facts in Barclay differed from those in Caldwell, however, in that
some of the NITUs issued for different portions of the railroad were subsequently substi-
tuted with new NITUs, thereby "vacat[ing]" the previous NITUs. Barclay v. United
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explained that, because the "'issuance of the NITU is the only govern-
ment action in the railbanking process,"' the NITU is the only possible
trigger for a takings action against the government.1°4 Therefore, the
statute of limitations must begin to run at the issuance of the first NITU,
• 105
even if that NITU is ultimately unsuccessful.
3. Judge Newman's Dissent
Barclay and Caldwell were heard by the same three-judge panel of the
Federal Circuit.' 6 Judge Pauline Newman dissented in both opinions.1
7
In her Caldwell dissent, Judge Newman argued that the majority's ruling
caused the statute of limitations to begin to accrue "from a date before
the Caldwell property was 'taken' in Fifth Amendment terms." 108 The
issuance of the NITU, she explained, did not "vest[] a cause of action in
the owner of the fee" because it was not "a ripened taking."' '° She ar-
gued that the government's "liability ... was not fixed" until the ease-
ment actually transferred from the railroad to the trail operator (here, the
City of Columbus), and that, in fact, the railroad "continued as owner of
the right-of-way, [and] retained all of the benefits and obligations of
ownership" until the conveyance of the easement.1
States, 351 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1173 (D. Kan. 2004), affd, 443 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006),
cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1328 (2007). The plaintiffs argued that the new NITU was a "dis-
tinct government action that affected [sic] a new taking." Barclay, 443 F.3d at 1376. How-
ever, the court determined that "the original NITU triggers the accrual of the cause of
action," id. at 1378, because "the series of STB NITU orders must be viewed as part of a
single and continuous government action." Id. at 1375. The court reasoned that "[a]ny
other approach would result in multiple potential takings of the same reversionary inter-
est." Id. at 1375.
104. Barclay, 443 F.3d at 1373 (quoting Caldwell, 391 F.3d at 1233); see supra notes 74-
75 and accompanying text; see also Hearing 2006, supra note 15 (statement of Rep. Todd
Akin and Rep. Russ Carnahan) (discussing changing the date the statute of limitations
begins to run in response to Caldwell).
105. See Barclay, 443 F.3d at 1378 ("[W]e adhere to Caldwell and hold that the issu-
ance of the original NITU triggers the accrual of the cause of action.").
106. The panel included Circuit Judges Newman, Dyk, and Prost. Barclay, 443 F.3d at
1370; Caldwell, 391 F.3d at 1228.
107. Barclay, 443 F.3d at 1378 (Newman, J., dissenting); Caldwell, 391 F.3d at 1236
(Newman, J., dissenting).
108. Caldwell, 391 F.3d at 1236 (Newman, J., dissenting).
109. Id.
110. Id. These "benefits and obligations of ownership" include such things as "the
right to exclude, the obligation to pay taxes, and liability for injury and liens." Id. at 1236.
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In her Barclay dissent,"' Judge Newman again explained that a taking
"cannot occur simply upon issuance of a NITU, because the deprivation
of the reversion has not yet occurred," and, she emphasized, "may never
occur." 112 Because the NITU is "prospective, and requires additional
steps by the rail carrier and others" before it can have legal effect"3 and
because the railroad is not required to "consummate an agreement for
rails-to-trails conversion,""14 it is not certain when the NITU is issued that
the railroad will ever be converted to a trail, and, consequently, there
cannot yet be a taking."5
Judge Newman suggested in the two dissents that a takings claim is not
ripe at the time the STB issues the NITU."6 Further, the plaintiffs do not
actually possess the necessary standing to sue until a later point."' Judge
111. Barclay, 443 F.3d at 1378 (Newman, J., dissenting). Judge Newman's Barclay
dissent was not enough to persuade the Federal Circuit to rehear the case en banc, so the
three-judge panel's decision stands. Barclay v. United States, No. 05-1255, 2006 U.S. App.
LEXIS 24389 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 12, 2006). En banc rehearing means that "[a] majority of the
circuit judges who are in regular active service" agree to hear the case as a full panel. FED.
R. APP. P. 35(a). Under Rule 35(a), the court will only hear a case en banc if "(1) en banc
consideration is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court's decisions; or (2)
the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance." Id. Interestingly, the
Federal Circuit cannot "overrule a binding precedent" unless it is sitting en banc. FED.
CIR. R. 35(a)(1). Therefore, it is possible that the Barclay panel could not have ruled any
differently if it considered Caldwell to be binding precedent, and that only with an en banc
hearing of Barclay could the result have been any different.
112. Barclay, 443 F.3d at 1378 (Newman, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 1379.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1380.
116. Id. at 1378; Caldwell v. United States, 391 F.3d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (New-
man, J., dissenting). Courts determine ripeness based on "whether a dispute has yet ma-
tured to a point that warrants decision." 13A CHARLEs ALLAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R.
MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3532 (2d ed.
1984). A claim is not yet ripe if it "involves uncertain or contingent future events that may
not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all." Id. § 3532 (Supp. 2006). The
purpose of the ripeness doctrine is to prevent plaintiffs from having "to sue in the face of
such uncertainty," so that the courts are not bogged down with suits that are not ready to
be heard. Boling v. United States, 220 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citing United
States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745, 749 (1947)). In other words, the ripeness doctrine pre-
vents courts from entertaining "mere hypothetical question[s]." WRIGHT, MILLER &
COOPER, supra, §§ 3532.1-.2 (2d ed. 1984) ("The central perception is that courts should
not render decisions absent a genuine need to resolve a real dispute. Unnecessary deci-
sions dissipate judicial energies .... ). Therefore, the ripeness doctrine requires that
"accrual of the claim [be] delayed until the situation becomes 'stabilized."' Dickinson, 331
U.S. at 749.
117. Barclay, 443 F.3d at 1380 (Newman, J., dissenting) (explaining that "[a] suit for
compensation is not ripe until the taking occurs," and that the NITU's "'delay' of possible
conversion to trail use, while it remains unknown whether trail use will occur at all, is not a
per se taking"); Caldwell, 391 F.3d at 1237 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("Negotiation of a
possible future event may state a hope and a plan, but it is not a fixed, ripe, and com-
pensable taking.").
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Newman emphasized in Barclay that takings claims "do[] not accrue until
'all events have occurred that fix the alleged liability of the government
and entitle the plaintiff to institute an action.". 18
II. THE CALDWELL AND BARCLAY DECISIONS MUST BE REMEDIED IN
THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE
A. Under Current Law, the Statute of Limitations for Rails-to- Trails Tak-
ings Begins to Run Before a Claim Exists
The current state of the law-that the statute of limitations on Rails-to-
Trails takings cases begins to run upon the issuance of a NITU by the
STB-provides a remedy before any claim is ripe."9 The issuance of a
NITU does not guarantee the transfer of the railroad right-of-way to a
trail operator.'2 As Judge Newman states in her Caldwell dissent,
"[i]ntentions are rarely actionable; it is the consummation that accrues
legal rights.''. Therefore, the statute of limitations should begin to run
only when the transfer is certain: the moment when the railroad company
transfers its interest in the land to the trail operator122
In addition, unlike with other takings, the NTSA takings process does
not involve condemnation procedures." 3 Because of this, "there is no
118. Barclay, 443 F.3d at 1380 (Newman, J., dissenting) (quoting Seldovia Native Ass'n
v. United States, 144 F.3d 769, 774 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
119. Id.; see also Boling, 220 F.3d at 1370.
120. See 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(d) (2006); see also Caldwell v. United States, 57 Fed. Cl.
193, 195 (2003) ("If the parties do not reach a Trail Use Agreement during the initial nego-
tiating period allowed by the NITU, and the ICC does not extend the negotiating period,
the NITU authorizes the railroad to exercise its option to abandon the line .... ), affd,
391 F.3d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Barclay, 443 F.3d at 1378 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("[T]he
NITU do[es] not make trail use mandatory, and if trail use is not achieved, the statute
effects abandonment of railway use and reversion of the right-of-way easement.").
121. Caldwell, 391 F.3d at 1238 (Newman, J., dissenting). The Barclay plaintiffs con-
tended that not all NITUs result in a transfer: "In 2002 ... there were approximately 68
different... NITU's... pending. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 85, at 52. Of
those, 19 resulted in the railroad filing a 'Consummation Notice' . . . on part or all of the
right-of-way segments." Id. In other words, 19 out of 68 NITUs ended in abandonment of
the right-of-way and reversion to the landowners. If more than 25 percent of NITUs fail to
ultimately effect a taking, then the taking cannot be said to occur at the time the STB
issues the NITU. See id. at 53.
122. See Barclay, 443 F.3d at 1381 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("[L]iability for a taking is
based on the change in use of the easement from railroad use to recreational trail. Until
that change is fixed and its occurrence firm, there is no accrual of the right to recover com-
pensation for such taking.").
123. Hearing 2002, supra note 3, at 23 (prepared statement of Nels Ackerson, Chair-
man, The Ackerson Group, Chartered); see also Preseault v. Interstate Commerce
Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1, 16 n.10 (1990) ("As administered by the ICC, the conversion process
begins when a railroad voluntarily seeks a ... NITU; it then negotiates with a qualified
trail operator to establish interim trail use. The ICC does not set up trails on its own and
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statutory framework to notify and explain rights or procedures to [the]
landowners."' 24 Therefore, the property owner receives no notice, of the
taking, no explanation of the taking, and no "plain statement of the au-
thority for the taking, '' ln as he would receive in formal condemnation
procedures. The fee simple landowner receives constructive notice only
if the deed for the easement is recorded at the end of the NTSA proc-126
ess. For purposes of the statute of limitations, this means that the claim
could accrue for years without the landowner's knowledge.
B. The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit's Decisions in Caldwell
and Barclay Disregard That Court's Own Precedent
The decisions in Caldwell and Barclay defy the Federal Circuit's own
precedent in three ways. First, the court rejected the government's ex-
pectation argument in Preseault II, but incorporated a similar expectation
argument in Caldwell and Barclay. 27 Second, in Caldwell itself, the court
explained that the retention of the STB's jurisdiction over the right-of-
way depended on the railroad and trail operator reaching an agree-
ment.' 28 And third, in Preseault II, the court specifically described the
taking as occurring at the moment the trail operator took possession of
the right-of-way. 129 The court's holdings in Caldwell and Barclay that the
statute of limitations begins to accrue at the issuance of the NITU ignore
this significant precedent.
has interpreted [NTSA] § 8(d) to exclude the type of condemnation power vested in the
Secretaries of the Interior and Agriculture by 16 U.S.C. § 1246(g).").
124. Hearing 2002, supra note 3, at 23 (prepared statement of Nels Ackerson, Chair-
man, The Ackerson Group, Chartered).
125. FED. R. Civ. P. 71A(c)(2). In 1998, the District of Columbia Circuit decided that
the STB is not required to give notice to the landowners at the time a NITU is issued.
Nat'l Ass'n of Reversionary Prop. Owners v. Surface Transp. Bd. (NARPO), 158 F.3d 135,
139 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("The notice provisions did not (as they do not today) provide for
individual notice to holders of reversionary interests of abandonment proceedings .... ).
The railroad is required, however, to notify other parties besides the property owner when
it intends to abandon:
When a railroad wishes to abandon a corridor it files a Notice of Intent with the
STB. The railroad must provide a copy of the Notice to significant users of the rail-
road, certain state entities including the governor, certain federal entities ... and rele-
vant railway labor organizations. The Notice must also be posted in relevant railroad
stations and published in a newspaper once a week for three weeks in each affected
county.
Id. (citing 49 C.F.R. § 1152.20(a)).
126. Cf. NARPO, 158 F.3d at 138-39 (detailing abandonment process).
127. Compare Preseault v. United States (Preseault II), 100 F.3d 1525, 1539-40 (Fed.
Cir. 1996), with Barclay, 443 F.3d at 1373, and Caldwell v. United States, 391 F.3d 1226,
1233-34 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
128. Caldwell, 391 F.3d at 1233.
129. Preseault II, 100 F.3d at 1550-51.
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In Preseault II, the court determined that the parties could not translate
a regulatory takings argument of "reasonable expectations" into a physi-
cal takings case.'3 The court rejected the government's argument that
the landowners should have expected the government to further burden
their land, not only because the argument incorrectly defined a property
owner's compensable property rights according to that owner's subjective
expectation of those rights,' but also because it muddled regulatory tak-
ings law with physical takings law.
132
In Caldwell and Barclay, the court upheld an expectation-based inter-
pretation of the NTSA: though the taking is only potential'33 at the time
the STB issues the NITU, it is likely to occur and the parties should ex-
pect it.'34 However, it is clear from the court's decision in Preseault H that
a landowner's expectation of a future transfer of the easement should not
be used to measure a physical taking,'3 ' because as the Barclay plaintiffs
argued, "[a] claim for a physical taking accrues at the time all events have
130. Id. at 1539-40. The lower court accepted the government's expectation argument,
explains Professor Jeff Sharp, in granting summary judgment against the Preseaults:
"[B]ecause Preseault bought the property subject to a viable railroad right-of-way, Pre-
seault never should have expected the railroad or the government to relinquish such a
valuable interest." Sharp, supra note 62, at 310. The lower court essentially determined
that because the Preseaults "had no reason to expect that [they] would reacquire the right-
of-way, [their] 'investment backed expectation' regarding that interest should have been
zero." Id. The Federal Circuit, according to Sharp, rejected this reasoning as "the gov-
ernment's specific authority for this novel approach to takings jurisprudence 'stood the law
on its head."' Id. at 314 (citing Preseault 11, 100 F.3d at 1540). Instead, the appellate court
"determined that the other concept involving property owners' expectations, regulatory
takings jurisprudence, was not relevant here, because [the Preseaults were] making a claim
based on a physical invasion by the government .... Id. at 315.
131. Preseault II, 100 F.3d at 1539-40; see also Sharp, supra note 62, at 315.
132. Preseault II, 100 F.3d at 1540; see also Sharp, supra note 62, at 315. In regulatory
takings cases, courts consider the property owner's "reasonable investment-backed expec-
tations" at the time he acquired the property, Sharp notes, because courts measure regula-
tory takings by a government regulation's adverse effects on the property owner's use of
his property. Sharp, supra note 62, at 315 n.81 (citing Preseault II, 100 F.3d at 1540).
133. See Corrected Brief of Appellee at 26, Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (No. 05-1255), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1328 (2007).
134. See Barclay, 443 F.3d at 1373, 1378; Caldwell, 391 F.3d at 1233-34. Caldwell and
Barclay both effectively hold that, once the STB has issued a NITU, the parties should
reasonably expect the railroad to transfer to a trail. Notably, the government in Caldwell
did not bring an expectation argument, and even argued in favor of the taking occurring at
the time of an agreement between the railroad company and the trail operator: "[T]he
NITU provides time for the parties to negotiate, but until they reach an interim trail use
agreement the NITU is effectively inchoate." Brief of Appellee at 18, Caldwell v. United
States, 391 F.3d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (No. 03-5152).
135. Preseault II, 100 F.3d at 1540.
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occurred to fix the government's liability,', 36 not at the time the parties
expect they might occur.
In addition, the Caldwell court cites precedent stating that "[t]he effect
of the notice, if the railroad and the prospective trail operator reach an
agreement, is that the STB retains jurisdiction for possible future railroad
use and the abandonment of the corridor is blocked.', 37 This statement
implies that the NITU's effectiveness depends on the railroad company
and the trail operator reaching an agreement. But an official agreement
does not occur when the STB issues the NITU; rather, it occurs at the end
of the process when the right-of-way is actually transferred to the trail
operator.' The court's holdings in Caldwell and Barclay, therefore, con-
tradict prior cases that conditioned the effect of a taking on the success of
an agreement.
Finally, in Preseault H, the court held that a taking occurred when the
trail operator, "pursuant to federal authorization, took possession of [the
rights-of-way] and opened them to public use."'3 9 The taking did not oc-
cur until the trail operator actually took control of the land. 14° This pas-
sage refutes the argument made by the government (and adopted by the
court) in Caldwell and Barclay that the only government action in NTSA
transfers is the issuance of the NITU.14 1 In Preseault H, the court de-
scribed'the trail operator's possession of the right-of-way as pursuant to
federal authority, indicating that the transfer of title constitutes indirect
government action. 42  In NTSA takings cases, therefore, the agreement
136. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants, supra note 85, at 24; see also Boling v. United
States, 220 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
137. Caldwell, 391 F.3d at 1229 (citing Nat'l Ass'n of Reversionary Prop. Owners v.
Surface Transp. Bd. (NARPO), 158 F.3d 135, 139 (D.C. Cir. 1998)) (emphasis added).
138. See id. at 1230; see also Barclay, 443 F.3d at 1381 (Newman, J., dissenting)
("[L]iability for a taking is based on the change in use of the easement from railroad use to
recreational trail. Until that change is fixed and its occurrence firm, there is no accrual of
the right to recover compensation for such taking.").
139. Preseault H, 100 F.3d at 1550.
140. Id. at 1550-51.
141. See Caldwell, 391 F.3d at 1233-34 ("The issuance of the NITU is the only govern-
ment action in the railbanking process that operates to prevent abandonment of the corri-
dor and to preclude the vesting of state law reversionary interests in the right-of-way.").
Because the finalization of the agreement "under the Trails Act" does not involve the
STB, but is solely between the railroad company and the trail operator, and because "the
regulations do not even require the railroad and the trail operator to notify the STB that
an agreement has been finalized," the court in Caldwell determined that there was no state
action after the issuance of the NITU. Id. at 1234; see also Barclay, 443 F.3d at 1373.
142. Preseault H, 100 F.3d at 1551. Indeed, the argument that the NITU is the only
state action is contrary to traditional takings law, which states that, if a third party acts
"pursuant to the [o]rder" of the government, "its actions [are], for purposes of takings
liability, the actions of the United States." Id.; see also supra notes 74-75 and accompany-
ing text.
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between the railroad company and the trail operator constitutes govern-
ment action and effects the taking.
C. The Federal Circuit's Decision on Accrual is Misplaced and Must Be
Overturned
Proponents of Caldwell and Barclay may argue that the statute of limi-
tations will no longer be a problem for landowners now that the Federal
Circuit has decided that the takings accrual date is set at the date of issu-
ance of the NITU. All future landowners will likely take notice of the
decisions and will bring their claims as early as possible.14 ' Though the
decisions may have adversely affected plaintiffs to date, all future land-
owners will be able to prevent the same outcome by following the hold-
ings of the Court of Appeals."
This argument has two problems. First, because the STB can extend
the NITU process at its discretion, the time from the first NITU issuance
to the completion of an agreement with a trail operator can span several
years.14 ' This means that the landowner may not have a viable claim until
after the statute of limitations has already run.'4 To avoid the lapse of
143. See Illig v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 47, 53-54, 56 (2005) (illustrating the signifi-
cant effect of Caldwell and Barclay on pending cases). According to Mr. Illig's testimony
at the 2006 congressional hearing on H.R. 4581, the government had decided to settle with
the Illigs in the amount of $72,000. Hearing 2006, supra note 15 (statement of Gale Illig).
However, just two days prior to a hearing to approve the settlement, the Federal Circuit
decided Caldwell. Id. Mr. Illig testified that:
The government claimed this case changed the law and meant that now the federal
government no longer had to pay us .... Understand that this was not because the
government did not take our property. Everyone agrees that the government took
our property. No, the Justice Department -because of the erroneous Caldwell deci-
sion-now claimed that they had taken our property nine months earlier and there-
fore should not have to pay.
Id.
144. See Hearing 2006, supra note 15 (statement of Marianne Wesley Fowler, Senior
Vice President of Federal Relations, Rails-to-Trails Conservancy) ("There is no evidence
that the Caldwell decision will unfairly deprive property owners of their rights to file 'tak-
ings' claims arising from the Railbanking Law. The only case in which a determination of
liability had already been made prior to its dismissal is the Illig case.").
145. See Caldwell, 391 F.3d at 1231-32 (discussing a two year period from the first issu-
ance of the NITU to the final agreement); see also Brief of Nat'l Ass'n of Reversionary
Prop. Owners et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 7, Caldwell v. United
States, 126 S. Ct. 366 (2005) (No. 04-1728), 2005 WL 1801276 ("A NITU ... may mark the
start of a period lasting six or more years, where no trail use conversion is consummated
during that period."). In particular, the brief cites a case in which "the NITU negotiating
period [was extended] ... more than nine years after the first NITU was served and with-
out consummation of trail use." Brief of Nat'l Ass'n of Reversionary Prop. Owners et al.
as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra, at 7.
146. See Hearing 2006, supra note 15 (statement of Rep. Todd Akin and Rep. Russ
Carnahan) ("Caldwell found that the statute of limitations for filing a claim begins to run
when negotiations begin; not when the trail agreement is finalized. These negotiations can
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their rights to compensation, landowners will begin bringing claims be-
fore they are ripe, causing unnecessary clogging of the judicial system as
courts hear and dismiss claims for lack of ripeness. Now that the Federal
Circuit has chosen the beginning of the NITU process as the start of the
statute of limitations period, plaintiffs will attempt to follow the court's
guidelines by bringing unripe claims, wasting judicial resources and their
own attorney's fees in the process.
Second, the bright-line rule set out by the Federal Circuit is in clear vio-
lation of the law. 47 It is a central tenet of property law that conditional
easements -those requiring a certain continuous action or activity for the
easement to remain in effect -automatically end when the conditional
activity ends.'4 Under the NTSA, the railroad company is prevented
from abandoning the right-of-way, and is therefore prevented from end-
ing the conditional activity of its easement. 49 The easement only ends,
therefore, at the moment the railroad passes the use of the right-of-way
to the trail operator.5° Additionally, takings law states that "the time of
the invasion constitutes the act of taking" for physical occupations."'
Under the NTSA, any takings claim should therefore be assessed accord-
ing to the trail operator's invasion, since the railroad company has al-
ready been in possession of the land up to that point.1
2
Finally, the Federal Circuit has previously determined that "a takings
claim accrues when 'all events which fix the government's alleged liability
have occurred""53 and that "the key date for accrual purposes is the date
on which the plaintiff's land has been clearly and permanently taken."'
1 4
Until the railroad company and the trail operator reach an agreement
and the interest in the land is transferred, the government's taking of the
last anywhere from six months up to several years."). But see id. (statement of Marianne
Wesley Fowler, Senior Vice President of Federal Relations, Rails-to-Trails Conservancy)
("The concern that the six-year statute of limitation could expire before the rail corridor is
ever transferred ... is a purely hypothetical concern that has never arisen in any takings
case, and that has no experiential basis.").
147. See Caldwell, 391 F.3d at 1235.
148. See supra note 15.
149. See supra notes 5-16 and accompanying text.
150. See Caldwell, 391 F.3d at 1237 (Newman, J., dissenting). Alternatively, of course,
the easement may end due to a lack of any agreement with a trail operator and the subse-
quent lapse of the NITU. See discussion supra note 121.
151. United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 258 (1980).
152. See Caldwell, 391 F.3d at 1236 (Newman, J., dissenting) ("Until the easement was
transferred to the City .... [the] Railroad not only continued as owner of the right-of-way,
but retained all of the benefits and obligations of ownership, including the right to exclude,
the obligation to pay taxes, and liability for injury and liens.").
153. Boling v. United States, 220 F.3d 1365, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting Hopland
Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, 855 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
154. Id. at 1370 (citing Seldovia Native Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 144 F.3d 769, 774
(Fed. Cir. 1998)).
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land under the NTSA cannot be fixed and the land cannot be clearly and
permanently taken. If there is still the possibility of railroad right-of-way
abandonment, the government has not completed the taking of the land.
Because the Federal Circuit's decisions in Caldwell and Barclay deter-
mine that the taking occurs at the issuance of the NITU, instead of at the
time of agreement or transfer of the deed, the decisions are contrary to
the law. The rule of these decisions must be modified in the interest of
justice.
III. LEGISLATIVE OR JUDICIAL ACTION IS REQUIRED TO REMEDY THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S INCORRECT INTERPRETATION OF THE NTSA
When Congress first enacted the NTSA in 1968, it aimed to minimize
opposition by directing that, "in selecting the rights-of-way" to be added
to the national system of trails, "full consideration [was to] be given to
minimizing the adverse effects upon the adjacent landowner or user and
his operation."'55 The original Act also called for "the advice and assis-
tance" not only of the state and local governments, but also of the "land-
owners and land users concerned.",
156
The current system of adversity, in which the government provides
155. National Trails System Act, Pub. L. No. 90-543, § 7(a), 82 Stat. 919, 922 (1968)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1246(a)(2) (2000)).
156. Id. § 7(a), 82 Stat. at 922-23. But see Preseault v. United States (Preseault I), 100
F.3d 1525, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (explaining that Congress likely did not foresee the tak-
ings issue when drafting the original NTSA because "[i]f Congress intended the 1920 Act
to have such an effect.., with the result of directly obligating the government to a poten-
tially enormous liability of unknown dimensions for takings throughout the United States,
there surely would have been some indication of that intent in the legislative history, if not
in the legislation itself.").
157. See Rails-to-Trails Conservancy, Fact Sheet: Working with Trail Opponents,
available at http://www.railstrails.org/resources/documents/resource docs/RTCFactSheet_
WorkingwTrailOpponents.pdf. The Rails-to-Trails debate has become adversarial. The
Conservancy website includes a page entitled "Working with Trail Opponents," which
suggests that rail-trail proponents "[flind allies ... [w]ithin the group of people who live
adjacent to the proposed rail-trail"; "invite an articulate landowner who was once opposed
to a rail-trail to come and speak in your community"; and "[w]ork the media... [to] gen-
erate support for your cause." Id. Additionally, the cite explains:
While trail opposition is one of the more difficult hurdles to overcome during rail-trail
development, it need not stall your project. If you take the initiative from the outset
to inform potential opponents about the trail project, listen to their concerns and keep
them involved in the planning process, you will have a much easier time building
strong support and creating a trail for your community.
Id.; see also Hearing 2002, supra note 3, at 9 (prepared statement of Danaya C. Wright)
("The fact that [Rails-to-Trails takings claims] have little merit ... does not mean they
have had little effect. I know personally of instances in which trail groups had obtained
federal funding for land acquisition which was thwarted because the land.., was tied up in
a class-action suit that did not even involve, directly, that corridor .... Perhaps the most
significant effect of this litigation is the chilling effect it has had on communities seeking to
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for negotiations between railroad companies and trail operators without
the input of, or even. notification to, the landowners, violates Congress's
express intent in enacting the National Trails System Act.1 8 The deci-
sions of the Federal Circuit in Caldwell and Barclay have created adver-
sity by setting the date for accrual of all Rails-to-Trails takings at the time
of the government's issuance of the NITU."5 9 Without any notice to the
landowners, and without any certainty that the rights-of-way will eventu-
ally become trails, the landowners' rights to compensation are taken from
them through the early accrual of their claim."O
In order to undo the legal errors of Caldwell and Barclay, one of three
remedies must occur: first, the Supreme Court should grant certiorari to
an NTSA takings case and hold that the statute of limitations begins at
the time the railroad transfers its interest in the right-of-way to the trail
operator under the NTSA; second, Congress should amend the NTSA to
include language setting the date for accrual of a takings claim at the date
the interest in the land is transferred; or, third, Congress should create a
new system of compensation so that landowners can receive just compen-
sation without the burden of litigation.
A. Supreme Court Action
Because NTSA takings claims are not actionable until the actual physi-
cal taking has occurred, claims should begin to accrue when the railroad
company transfers the land to the trail operator.16 ' A claim cannot begin
to accrue for purposes of the statute of limitations while the taking is
speculative, as it generally is at the time the STB issues the NITU. 62
Therefore, the Supreme Court should grant certiorari to an NTSA tak-
ings case and overrule the Federal Circuit's holding that the statute of
prevent rail corridor destruction. Threats of multi-million-dollar lawsuits and recall elec-
tions have stifled many city and county commissioners from taking advantage of the op-
portunity to railbank corridors and use them for interim trails."). Professor Wright also
contended in her prepared statement for the 2002 hearing that "[t]he lawyers are getting
richer but the landowner rarely gets a dime." Hearing 2002, supra note 3, at 9 (prepared
statement of Danaya C. Wright).
158. See National Trails System Act §§ 2, 7(a), 82 Stat. at 919, 922-23.
159. See discussion supra Parts III.D.1-2.
160. See, e.g., Hearing 2006, supra note 15 (statement of Gale Illig).
161. See Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Newman, J.,
dissenting); Caldwell v. United States, 391 F.3d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Newman, J.,
dissenting).
162. See Allen v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 677, 680 (2000). Claims against the gov-
ernment begin accruing "'when all the events have occurred which fLx the liability of the
government and entitle the claimant to institute an action .... .' Id. (quoting Kinsey v.
United States, 852 F.2d 556, 557 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
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limitations for NTSA compensation under the Tucker Act begins to ac-
crue at the issuance of the NITU.'6
It is unlikely, however, that the Supreme Court will grant certiorari to
an NTSA takings decision by the Federal Circuit. First, the Federal Cir-
cuit itself cannot hear claims similar to Caldwell and Barclay now that
those decisions have been rendered.' 6' In addition, there is no circuit split
on the issue of NTSA statute of limitations accrual.'65 The Federal Cir-
cuit's decisions in Caldwell and Barclay are not in conflict with the deci-
sions of any other court of appeals on the same issue because the Federal
Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from the Court of Federal
Claims, which hears all Tucker Act cases for compensation.'"
The same three-judge panel heard both Caldwell and Barclay, further
exacerbating the situation.'67 The only other possibility for review would
163. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2000) ("Cases in the courts of appeals may be
reviewed by the Supreme Court by the following methods: (1) By writ of certiorari granted
upon the petition of any party... before or after rendition of judgment or decree; (2) By
certification at any time by a court of appeals of any question of law ... as to which in-
structions are desired, and upon such certification the Supreme Court may give binding
instructions or require the entire record to be sent up for decision of the entire matter in
controversy."); see also Sup. CT. R. 10 ("A review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of
right, but of judicial discretion.").
164. See, e.g., Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1338
(Fed. Cir. 2007) ("This court respects the principle of stare decisis and follows its own
precedential decisions unless the decisions are 'overruled by the court en banc, or by other
controlling authority such as an intervening ... Supreme Court decision."' (quoting Tex.
Am. Oil Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 44 F.3d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (alteration in
original))).
165. See Sup. CT. R. 10(a). One of the possiblereasons for Supreme Court considera-
tion arises when "a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with
the decision of another United States court of appeals on the same important matter." Id.
However, the list of potential reasons for Supreme Court consideration is "neither control-
ling nor fully measuring [of] the Court's discretion." Sup. CT. R. 10.
166. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3) (2000) (making it impossible for Caldwell and Barclay
to be in conflict with decisions from other Courts of Appeals because "[t]he United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction ... of an appeal
from a final decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims."); see also ERWIN C.
SURRENCY, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 100 (2d ed. 2002) ("In 1982, the appel-
late division of the Court of Claims ... and the Court of Patent and Customs Appeals were
combined as the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the first Court of Appeals with a
subject jurisdiction to hear appeals from the entire Country.").
167. Compare Barclay v. United States, 443 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (heard by
Judges Newman, Dyk & Prost), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1328 (2007), and Caldwell v. United
States, 391 F.3d 1226, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (same panel), with United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, About the Court, http://www.fedcir.gov/about.html (last
visited Feb. 12, 2007) (explaining that judges are randomly assigned to panels). Federal
Circuit judges are assigned to odd-numbered panels for each case, and case assignments
are made "so as to provide each judge with a representative cross-section of the fields of
law within the jurisdiction of the court." FED. CIR. R. 47.2.
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be an en banc rehearing of an NTSA takings case,168 but the court has
already refused en banc rehearing of both Caldwell and Barclay, 69 and it
appears unlikely a similar case on the timing of the statute of limitations
will reach the court.
B. Legislative Action
Legislative action is necessary if the Supreme Court is unwilling to hear
an NTSA takings case. Congress created the Rails-to-Trails Act, and can
adjust its legislation if lawmakers feel the courts are interpreting it incor-
rectly °70 There would only be a separation of powers problem with a
legislative solution if the legislature attempts to undo a final judicial deci-
sion.171 In other words, as long as the legislation does not attempt to ret-
roactively modify the Federal Circuit's decisions in Caldwell and Barclay,
a legislative solution should be permissible.
Representatives W. Todd Akin (R-MO) and Russ Carnahan (D-MO)
proposed a bill on this issue in 2005.173 The proposed bill, entitled The
Easement Owners Fair Compensation Claims Act (EOFCCA) was not
passed, and in 2007 the bill died. 4 The bill would have changed the start-
ing date for the limitations period from the date of application to the date
168. See ROBERT A. CARP & RONALD STIDHAM, THE FEDERAL COURTS 23 (4th ed.
2001) (noting that the only possibility for a different opinion on the same case by a court of
appeals is by petitioning for an en banc rehearing of the case, "in which all the circuit's
judges sit together on a panel and decide a case").
169. Barclay v. United States, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 24389 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 12, 2006);
Caldwell v. United States, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 16092 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 23, 2005).
170. See, e.g., W. Va. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 113-15 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (discussing congressional responses to Supreme Court decisions).
171. See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 220 (1995) (noting that the
legislature is barred from retroactively changing a decision of the courts to prevent parties
to a suit from having their final judgment vacated after expensive litigation).
172. Cf. id. at 220-21 (discussing problems with retroactive legislative adjustments). In
Plaut, the Supreme Court determined that a bill passed by Congress retroactively changed
decisions made by the judicial branch, in violation of the separation of powers. Id. at 225.
According to the Court's decision, there are three kinds of legislative actions that violate
the "text, structure, and traditions of Article III": first, statutes that "'prescribe rules of
decision to the Judicial Department ... in cases pending before it"'; second, legislative
action that "vest[s] review of the decisions of Article III courts in officials of the Executive
Branch"; and third, actions that reopen cases that have been decided by the Judiciary
because these decisions "'conclusively resolve[] the case,"' and because the Judiciary has
the power "'to say what the law is' in particular cases and controversies." Id. at 218-19
(citations omitted).
173. H.R. 4581, 109th Cong. (2005); see also S. 3478, 109th Cong. (2006) (companion
bill in Senate, sponsored by Senators Christopher S. Bond (R-MO) and Jim Talent (R-
MO)).
174. The EOFCCA was introduced during the 109th session of Congress, and because
the session ended without a vote on the bill, it died.
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of transfer.' In their introduction of the bill, Representatives Akin and
Carnahan explained that the EOFCCA "[would] not change or frustrate
the purpose of the Trails Act in any way."' 76 To the contrary, the bill
"[would have] assure[d] that the administration of the Trails Act [wa]s
consistent with Congress' intention and [would have made] the Trails Act
a more cost-effective program."'77
The EOFCCA would not have retroactively reversed any final judicial
decision. Therefore, though the legislation Representatives Akin and
Carnahan presented to Congress was constitutional, it would not have
reversed Caldwell or Barclay, and those decisions would stand. 178 The
effect of the legislation, instead, would have been to adjust the statute of
limitations accrual date on any pending cases, and on all future cases
brought to the U.S. Court of Federal Claims for compensation related to
the NTSA.
179
Congress did not adopt the EOFCCA, but on July 24, 2007, Represen-
tative Carnahan introduced a similar bill.Y ° This bill, entitled the Trails
Act Technical Corrections Act (TATCA), similarly seeks to amend the
NTSA by setting the statute of limitations accrual date at the end of the
transfer process. But the TATCA does something that the EOFCCA
did not: it includes a provision requiring courts to reconsider past cases in
which plaintiffs were negatively affected by the Barclay and Caldwell
decisions.'82
175. H.R. 4581, § 2(a)(2). The EOFCCA proposes that the National Trail Systems Act
be amended to include the following language:
In any action brought against the United States, by the owner of property that is sub-
ject to a railroad right-of-way... for damages.. ., the claim for damages shall not be
deemed to first accrue for purposes of the limitations period prescribed by [The
Tucker Act] before the date on which-(A) the State, political subdivision, or quali-
fied private organization has, by written agreement, assumed full responsibility for
such right-of-way and interim use ... ; and (B) the railroad has in writing conveyed an
interest in such right of way [sic] to such State, political subdivision, or qualified pri-
vate organization, by donation, transfer, lease, sale, or otherwise.
Id.
176. Hearing 2006, supra note 15 (statement of Rep. Todd Akin and Rep. Russ
Carnahan).
177. Id.
178. See supra note 172.
179. See Hearing 2006, supra note 15 (statement of Rep. Todd Akin and Rep. Russ
Carnahan).
180. H.R. 3157, 110th Cong. (2007); see also S. 2073, 110th Cong. (2007) (companion
bill in Senate, sponsored by Senators Claire McCaskill (D-MO) and Christopher S. Bond
(R-MO)).
181. Id.
182. Id. § 2(c) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court in which the
claim was originally filed shall review on the merits, without regard to the defense of res
judicata or collateral estoppel, any claim that-(A) was brought against the United States,
by the owner of property that is subject to a railroad right-of-way and to interim use... ;
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This provision leaves the TATCA vulnerable to a constitutional chal-
lenge based on separation of powers concerns, because Congress cannot
retroactively modify judicial decisions.' Though this Comment supports
the passage of the TATCA, the bill must first be revised to prevent such a
constitutional challenge. The implementation of a fairer NTSA takings
system requires alteration of the bill to exclude the requirement that the
judiciary review past decisions such as Caldwell and Barclay.
The EOFCCA was a simple solution to an unsettling problem, and,
though it would not have corrected the rulings in Caldwell and Barclay, it
would have ensured that future landowners receive just compensation for
the taking of their rights-of-way under the NTSA. TATCA should be
amended similarly to adjust the NTSA compensation system for future
takings claims without attempting to alter past decisions.
C. New Condemnation System
If the Supreme Court continues to deny certiorari to NTSA cases and
the TATCA is unsuccessful, a third option is to create a new system of
formal condemnation for Rails-to-Trails takings cases. Currently, a land-
owner must bring litigation under the Tucker Act if he discovers that the
STB has issued a NITU for the right-of-way on his land. 84 Instead, Con-
gress could create a new system in which landowners are notified of the
possible abandonment, and the court oversees the condemnation and
compensation process.
This system should be modeled after general condemnation proceed-
ings for non-NTSA takings: the STB would be required to submit a com-
plaint or petition for the taking of the land.In All possible property own-
ers would be served with process and notified of the proceedings.
86
Property owners could then serve a notice of appearance87 and would
(B) was dismissed, before the date of the enactment of this Act, for not being brought
within the time period provided... ; and (C) would have been considered to have been
brought in a timely manner if the amendments.., had been in effect when the claim was
brought ...."). According to the bill, a negatively-affected plaintiff must bring his claim
within 60 days of the enactment of the bill. Id.
183. See supra notes 171-172 and accompanying text.
184. See Hearing 2002, supra note 3, at 17-18 (statement of Nels Ackerson, Chairman,
The Ackerson Group, Chartered). Even were the TATCA to pass, however, certain issues
would still remain. For example, under the NTSA there is no system in place to provide
for compensation without costly litigation. See id. at 17 ("Unlike other areas of govern-
ment takings, when land is taken for a trail, there is no established system for compensa-
tion to the land owners; no process for the government to make a good-faith offer; no
established appraisal or valuation system; no grievance process; and no remedy for the
landowner, other than full-scale litigation under the Tucker Act.").
185. Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 71A(c) (governing condemnation proceedings).
186. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 71A(c)(2).
187. Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 71A(e). If the STB, or any other federal agency, is unable to
carry out condemnation-like proceedings, an alternative to the condemnation proceedings
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receive notice of all subsequent STB action on the transfer of their land
to a trail operator.188 Rather than determining the compensation amount
through Tucker Act litigation, the STB would include in its complaint an
approximation of the compensation to be paid.
The STB would submit the complaint when the railroad company and
the trail operator are ready to come to an agreement. No complaint
could be issued prior to this point, because the complaint (just as under
regular condemnation proceedings) would have to specify the reasons for
the taking and the STB's authority to take the land under eminent do-
main.189 The statute of limitations would no longer cause conflict because
most, if not all, property owners would be aware of the taking upon ser-
vice of process, and compensation would be paid prior to the trail opera-
tor's taking possession of the land. 9°
IV. CONCLUSION
Congress set out to create a system in which all affected parties would
work together to create a nationwide procedure for establishing trails for
public use. 91 In order to return to the original vision of the National
Trails System Act, the system of takings must be adjusted. Though the
Federal Circuit decided Caldwell and Barclay with the intention of creat-
might be to simply require the STB to give notice to the landowners at the time it issues
the NITU. However, this alternative would still require costly litigation before landowners
could receive compensation. Though it would be a vast improvement on the current sys-
tem, it would not remedy one of the largest injustices of the NTSA as it now stands. See,
e.g., Hearing 2002, supra note 3, at 17-18 (statement of Nels Ackerson, Chairman, The
Ackerson Group, Chartered) (explaining that the current system produces much expensive
litigation).
188. Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 71A(e). Because the Supreme Court has already held in Pre-
seault I that the NTSA is constitutional, the system would likely not include the opportu-
nity to answer the complaint with objections to the taking itself. Compare id. (providing
that a defendant property owner may challenge the government's decision to exercise its
power of eminent domain), with Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n (Preseault 1),
494 U.S. 1, 17 (1990) (holding that the 1983 Amendments to the NTSA are valid under the
Commerce Clause).
189. Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 71A(c)(2). Before a trail operator has come forward and
agreed to take over the deed from the railroad company, the STB would not have suffi-
cient reason to take the land in condemnation-like proceedings, thus eliminating the issue
argued in Caldwell and Barclay, by setting the date for statute of limitations accrual pur-
poses at the date of filing of the complaint with the court. Cf. Barclay v. United States, 443
F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1328 (2007); Caldwell v. United
States, 391 F.3d 1226, 1228 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
190. Cf. E. Tenn. Natural Gas Co. v. Sage, 361 F.3d 808, 821 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing
Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1984)) (explaining that under
traditional condemnation procedures, the government must pay just compensation prior to
taking possession of the property).
191. See Preseault 1, 494 U.S. at 5.
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ing a bright-line rule for determining the start-date of the statute of limi-
tations, it has instead built a system of adversity that must be changed.
As Judge Newman noted in her Barclay dissent, "some twenty-two
pending cases arising from the National Trails System Act" currently
exist.192 The large number of cases currently pending demonstrates the
unfortunate impact Caldwell and Barclay will have on future cases involv-
ing NTSA takings. Additionally, the current interpretation of the NTSA
creates wasteful government spending because it promotes unnecessary
or premature litigation.
Because the current interpretation of the NTSA creates a confusing
segment of time in which landowners have not yet been harmed but the
clock has started ticking on their claim for compensation, landowners will
be forced to choose between costly litigation on unripe claims or risking
the expiration of their claim. This system begs for frivolous litigation at
government and landowner expense.
The Rails-to-Trails Act is an innovative program that allows for public
enjoyment of unused land. This Comment does not advocate for a
change that would prevent or deter the transfer of railroad rights-of-way
to trails. Rather, this Comment advocates for the strengthening of the
program through adherence to the basic tenets of traditional property
and takings law. By working with the landowners to ensure their receipt
of just compensation, the system will become one of cooperation rather
than adversity. Without a fair system, litigation and dispute will continue.
192. Barclay, 443 F.3d at 1381 (Newman, J., dissenting); see also Hearing 2002, supra
note 3, at 16 (prepared statement of Thomas L. Sansonetti, Assistant Att'y Gen., Envi-
ronment and Natural Resources Division, U.S. Department of Justice) ("The number of
rails-to-trails cases that the Environment Division handles has increased dramatically in
the last few years. in 1990, we had one case with one claimant. Now, we have seventeen
cases scattered across the nation with approximately 4,550 claimants.").
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